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THE JUVENILE CURFEW: UNCONSTITUTIONAL
IMPRISONMENT
Tona Trollinger"
Faced with rising crime rates, many municipalities in recent years have enact-
ed juvenile curfews. Professor Tona Trollinger uses an ordinance enacted in Dal-
las, Texas, as a framework for analyzing juvenile curfews. The author discusses
various prudential and constitutional objections to these curfews, including both
substantive and procedural due process challenges. The author concludes that the
admittedly valid governmental objectives underlying such curfews do not override
their constitutional infirmities.
[T]he [curfew] ordinance.., is paternalistic, and is an
invasion of the personal liberty of the citizen. It may be that
there are some bad boys in our cities and towns whose par-
ents do not properly control them at home and who prowl
about the streets and alleys during the nighttime and commit
offenses. Of course, whenever they do, they are amenable to
the law .... The rule laid down here is as rigid as under
military law, and makes the tolling of the curfew bell equiva-
lent to the drum taps of the camp. . . . [Ift is an undue
invasion of the personal liberty of the citizen [and] an at-
tempt to usurp the parental functions....
Ex parte McCarver, 46 S.W. 936, 937 (Tex. Crim. App. 1898).
Lecturer in Law, University of Missouri-Kansas City; LL.M. 1994, Georgetown
University Law Center; J.D. 1983, B.A. 1979, Southern Methodist University. I chal-
lenged the constitutionality of the Dallas ordinance on behalf of the North Texas chap-
ter of the American Civil Liberties Union from its inception in city council committee
to the present. Although I strive in this Article to present equitably both sides of the
controversy, I am not without bias. My special thanks go to Professor David Cole for
his invaluable tutelage and for comments on earlier drafts; to Bruce Anton and Bruce
Morrow for co-litigating Qutb and for their tireless work, endless friendship, and con-
stant moral support and love; to Joe Cook, former Executive Director, ACLU of North
Texas, for his vigor, determination, and unwavering belief in us and in the case; and to
William Fisher, Sabrina Qutb, and Peggy Lawlis, the juveniles whose hearts and souls
so believed in a cause that they withstood the wrath of a city to pursue their ideals.
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The curfew ordinance recognizes the dangers to which mi-
nors are subject if allowed at nighttime to be upon the
streets unattended by adults. Legislation peculiarly applica-
ble to minors is necessary for their proper protection. Like-
wise, due to their immaturity, legislation peculiarly applica-
ble to minors is warranted for the protection of the public,
e.g., to protect the community from youths aimlessly roaming
the streets during the nighttime hours.
Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242, 1257
(M.D. Pa. 1975), aft'd, 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 964 (1976).
INTRODUCTION
The juvenile' curfews that proliferate across the nation are both a recent
and a not so recent 2 tool to confront a continually increasing rate of juve-
nile crime and victimization. Curfews are as controversial3 as they are com-
mon. A prophylactic device often shrouded in virulent discrimination,4 the
curfew is both touted as a necessary adjunct to existing criminal laws and
criticized as an imprudent and unconstitutional intrusion into cherished free-
doms. It is essential to effective law enforcement in an era of family disinte-
gration and gang violence. It is a scourge on the integrity of law-abiding
youths and is constitutionally intolerable.
In this Article, the terms "juvenile," "youths," and "minors" are used interchange-
ably to refer to persons covered by curfew laws restricting the activities of younger
citizens. Although most laws set the outside age at 16 or 17, some restrict persons 18
years of age and older. Kansas City, Missouri, for example, enacted a curfew for per-
sons under the age of 21 covering a popular night section of the city. Kansas City, Mo.,
Ordinance 941,914 (1993). The ACLU affiliate challenged the curfew as unconstitution-
al under the Missouri Constitution, which established 18 as the age of majority. The
parties settled, and the city repealed the ordinance. City of Kansas City v. Salyer, No.
MA-94-1461 (Mo. Cir. Ct., Jackson Co. 1993) (record sealed under Missouri's "Sun-
shine Law").
2 The long, sometimes tumultuous, history of the curfew is well-chronicled in litera-
ture and in case law. See Thistlewood v. Trial Magistrate, 204 A.2d 688, 690-91 (Md.
1964); Eastlake v. Ruggiero, 220 N.E.2d 126, 127-28 (Ohio Ct. App. 1966); Note,
Curfew Ordinances and the Control of Nocturnal Juvenile Crime, 107 U. PA. L. REV.
66, 66 n.5 (1958) [hereinafter Curfew Ordinances].
3 One writer astutely characterized the curfew: "Once, kids were supposed to be
seen, not heard. But today, some cities don't want to see them, either." Curfews on Kids
No Answer to Crime, USA TODAY, June 18, 1991, at 12A [hereinafter Curfews on
Kids].
' See infra note 31.
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This Article discusses prudential and constitutional considerations under-
lying the juvenile curfew controversy, using as a blueprint a Dallas ordi-
nance and the litigation it spawned. Part I proposes a framework of polar
prototypical ordinances, differentiating on existential and constitutional
planes the emergency and juvenile laws. Part II addresses the often
catechismic prudential arguments framing the controversy. Part III chron-
icles the Dallas experience from the passage of the original ordinance in
June 1991 to the denial of the petition for certiorari issued May 31, 1994.
Part IV examines the deprivation of procedural due process inherent in most
curfew ordinances, which are rarely, if ever, challenged. Part V describes
possible substantive due process deficiencies, encompassing such enumerat-
ed liberties as freedom of speech, freedom of association, and such
unenumerated liberties as freedom of movement and parental privacy. Part
V closes with an analysis of equal protection challenges, including the po-
tential for selective enforcement. The section concludes that, stripped of its
vestments, the blanket curfew law operates to give police officers, who are
otherwise constrained by the Fourth Amendment,5 reasonable suspicion to
stop and question youths appearing at night in suspicious circumstances.
This may be the curfew's primary purpose and its greatest advantage; it is,
however, in its entire ambit, its constitutionally irremediable vice.
I. THE CURFEW: ORDINANCES AT THE POLES
Curfew ordinances are divisible analytically into two types: emergency
and non-emergency.6 The former typically encompass situations of natural
and human disaster,7 while laws regulating juvenile nocturnal activity gen-
erally fall into the latter category. Emergency and non-emergency curfews
differ in scope and breadth, resulting in divergent prudential and constitu-
tional characteristics and conclusions.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see infra note 106 and accompanying text.
6 Some courts also distinguish between laws that proscribe "presence" or "being"
and laws that prohibit "remaining" or "loitering." See, e.g., People v. McKelvy, 100
Cal. Rptr. 661, 665 (Ct. App. 1972) (noting that "mere presence on the street during the
prohibited hours cannot constitute 'loitering' within the meaning of penal statutes or
police regulations"); People v. Walton, 161 P.2d 498, 501 (Cal. Ct. App. 1945) (holding
that ordinance using term "remain" prohibits "tarrying and staying unnecessarily upon
the streets and public places," but does not restrict "using" or "going to or from places
of business or amusement or otherwise"). Other courts have rejected this distinction.
See, e.g., Thistlewood v. Trial Magistrate, 204 A.2d 688, 691 (Md. 1964) (noting that
zealous enforcement may make one the equivalent in practice of the other). Specific
laws directed against "loitering" are not within the scope of this Article. "Traveling"
laws form a possible third category. Interstate "travel" generally is excepted from cur-
few ordinances. Most laws necessarily restrict intrastate travel, raising the issue of
whether this activity is a fundamental freedom. See infra part V.B.4.
' See, e.g., Moorhead v. Farrelly, 723 F. Supp. 1109 (D.V.1. 1989).
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A. The Blanket Curfew: Scope and Breadth
The typical 'contemporary juvenile curfew law operates as a blanket,'
restricting the nocturnal9 public movements and activities of persons under
the age of sixteen or seventeen. In stark contrast to the emergency curfew, it
truly is a "blanket" prohibition in that it extends to virtually all activities"°
of covered persons occurring within the proscribed period." The youth law
is usually not spatially limited to a particular geographic area within a
city, 2 confined to a specific exigency, or narrowly limited in duration. To
conform to judicial precedent and anticipated constitutional challenges, 3
' See, e.g., City of Wadsworth v. Owens, 536 N.E.2d 67, 69 (Wadsworth Mun. Ct.,
Ohio 1987) (observing that "the court can find no compelling state interest that would
justify the blanket prohibition contained in" an ordinance prohibiting parents or guard-
ians from allowing minors to be in public during certain hours).
9 The typical effective hours of a curfew are between 11:00 p.m. or midnight to
6:00 a.m. Recently, New Orleans enacted a dawn to dusk curfew that police claim is
reducing the volume of criminal activity. See Crime in N.O. Reduced Overall, TIMES
PICAYUNE, Nov. 15, 1994, at Al.
10 Each law contains a set of exceptions to violations or defenses to prosecution. See
infra notes 13-20 and accompanying text.
'1 See, e.g., Johnson v. City of Opelousas, 658 F.2d 1065 (5th Cir. 1981).
12 Most juvenile curfew laws are enacted by municipalities and extend across the
municipal jurisdictional area. Illinois enacted a state-wide curfew in 1973, originally
applicable to all persons under 18 years of age and amended in 1975 to apply to per-
sons under 17 years. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, para. 2371 (1975). The statute, as amend-
ed, excepts persons "accompanied and supervised by a parent, legal guardian or other
responsible companion at least 18 years of age approved by a parent or legal guardian
or ... engaged in a business or occupation which the laws of this State authorize a
person less than 17 years to perform." Id. An Illinois appellate court held the statute
unconstitutional, ruling that its terms were vague and that it abridged First Amendment
liberties and freedom of movement and travel without the "compelling emergency" that
is necessary to justify "temporary suspension of fundamental liberties." People v.
Chambers, 335 N.E.2d 612, 617-18 (II1. App. Ct. 1975), rev'd, 360 N.E.2d 55 (I11.
1976). The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, finding that the statute was not aimed at
fundamental freedoms and that, given the "phenomenon of increased juvenile crime,"
the State was justified in acting on the assumption that "when a child is at home during
the late night and early morning hours, [the child] is protected from physical as well as
moral dangers." People v. Chambers, 360 N.E.2d 55, 57 (Ill. 1976). The court was not
presented with evidence of either the "phenomenon" or the relative safety of children in
the home, and both conclusions are disputable. The statute, in substantially similar form,
remains a part of Illinois law. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 720, para. 555/1 (Smith-Hurd 1993).
" Governing bodies enacting curfew ordinances are well aware of potential constitu-
tional infirmities. In Dallas, the ACLU affiliate informed the city council that it would
challenge the ordinance upon passage. Several councilmembers alluded to its possible
unconstitutionality but nevertheless voted in favor of the ordinance.
952 [Vol. 4:3
JUVENILE CURFEW: UNCONSTITUTIONAL IMPRISONMENT
the juvenile law typically excepts certain activities. A 1981 Fifth Circuit
case that held unconstitutionally overbroad an ordinance that excepted only
minors accompanied by a parent or "responsible adult" or upon an "emer-
gency errand"14 suggests the necessary, if not sufficient, constitutionally
significant conditions.15 Reserving opinion on the validity of an ordinance
"narrowly drawn to accomplish proper social objectives,'' 6 the court held
that the failure to except certain activities rendered the ordinance before it
constitutionally deficient:
[U]nder this curfew ordinance minors are prohibited from
attending associational activities such as religious or school
meetings, organized dances, and theater and sporting events,
when reasonable and direct travel to or from these activities
has to be made during the curfew period. The same inhibi-
tion prohibits parents from urging and consenting to such
protected associational activity by their minor children. The
curfew ordinance also prohibits a minor during the curfew
period from, for example, being on the sidewalk in front of
his house, engaging in legitimate employment, or traveling
through [the city] even on an interstate trip.17
As a result of this and similar rulings, contemporary laws provide excep-
tions for these and comparable activities. 8 Thus, minors do not violate a
curfew when they engage in constitutionally protected conduct, attend civic
or adult-sponsored functions, are involved in employment, travel to or from
certain listed excepted activities or employment, or engage in interstate trav-
el. 9 In addition, married or emancipated minors also typically are excepted
from the purview of the curfew law.2'
The effect of the exceptions is debatable. Even with proliferous excep-
tions, a blanket curfew law prohibits every innocent-and guilty-person
14 Johnson, 658 F.2d at 1071.
'5 Id. at 1074.
16 Id. at 1072.
17 Id.
" See, e.g., Dallas, Tex. Ordinance No. 20,966 (June 10, 1991) [hereinafter Original
Dallas Ordinance]; Dallas, Tex. Ordinance No. 21,309 (June 12, 1992) [hereinafter
Amended Dallas Ordinance]; infra notes 102-05.
See, e.g., Original Dallas Ordinance, supra note 18, § 31-33(c).
See, e.g., id. § 31-33(c)(1)(1). Arguably, the exception is disingenuous. Any argu-
ment that married or emancipated minors are less prone to crime is belied by the con-
tinually increasing adult crime rate. The exception likely results from a conception that
although blanket adult curfews are unconstitutional, the different legal and factual status
of minors makes constitutional the juvenile curfew enactment.
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within its purview from moving about as she pleases at night.2 If free
movement is a fundamental constitutional liberty,2" or if curfew laws nec-
essarily abridge other fundamental liberties, exceptions to a violation may
not salvage the law. As one court astutely noted, "it is what these curfews
restrict, and not what they exempt, that matters most."23 A blanket law still
covers far more than it leaves available. Thus, a blanket curfew law replete
with every possible exception that would not render ineffective its proscrip-
tions might still sweep too widely to survive a constitutional challenge. The
pivotal issue, therefore, may be the inherent scope of the restriction, irre-
spective of the scope of the exceptions.
B. The Emergency Curfew: Limitation to Exigency
In contrast, the emergency curfew is by definition more narrowly tai-
lored in scope.' It is enacted to meet a specific, short-term exigency, and
is limited spatially and temporally to the scope of the exigency.26 Emergen-
cy curfews addresses the extraordinary ramifications of such natural and hu-
man-made disasters as riots,27 extreme disorderly conduct,' hurricanes,29
21 See id.; see also infra notes 275-79 and accompanying text.
22 See infra part V.B.4.
Waters v. Barry, 711 F. Supp. 1125, 1136 (D.D.C. 1989).
2 The scope of the exceptions is informative and can ameliorate, although possibly
not eviscerate, all constitutional deficiencies. See infra notes 275-82 and accompanying
text.
2 Emergency curfews tend to be more specific, but specificity is not a constitutional
panacea. Some emergency laws may operate so expansively as to be constitutionally
intolerable. In general, however, the limited breadth of emergency laws constitutionally
differentiates them from the blanket curfew. For pedagogical purposes, the term "emer-
gency" is used in this Article to designate the narrowly drawn law in contrast to the
blanket provision.
26 See Moorhead v. Farrelly, 723 F. Supp. 1109, 1112-13 (D.V.I. 1989).
27 See, e.g., United States v. Chalk, 441 F.2d 1277 (4th Cir.) (holding constitutional
a curfew imposed upon declaration of the existence of a state of emergency following a
racial clash between police and 200 to 250 students at an Asheville, North Carolina
high school that resulted in broken windows, damaged cars, and serious personal inju-
ries), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 943 (1971); Davis v. Justice Court, 89 Cal. Rptr. 409 (Ct.
App. 1970) (holding constitutional a curfew imposed on persons in a housing project
that was permeated by continuous riotous conditions, including promiscuous discharge
of firearms and rock and bottle throwing); State v. Boles, 240 A.2d 920 (Conn. Cir. Ct.
1967) (holding constitutional a limited curfew imposed after New Haven was "rocked
asunder by tumultuous and riotous conditions [in which] looting and destruction of
property were prevalent; and the general welfare of the entire city was seriously threat-
ened"); Glover v. District of Columbia, 250 A.2d 556 (D.C. 1969) (holding constitu-
tional a one-day curfew imposed on all persons in the District of Columbia following
riots dispersed throughout the District with no discernible pattern that threatened prop-
erty, persons, and exercise of rights); Ervin v. State, 163 N.W.2d 207 (Wis. 1968)
[Vol. 4:3
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earthquakes,3" and war," and typically is predicated on a continuing dec-
(holding constitutional a curfew imposed to prevent riot from occurring in Milwaukee in
the summer of 1967). During the 1943 race riots, Detroit imposed a curfew that re-
quired all persons without important business or not traveling to or from employment to
remain in their place of abode between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m. See NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF
MUNICIPAL LAW OFFICERS REPORT, MUNICIPAL CURFEW FOR MINORS-MODEL ORDI-
NANCE ANN. (1943). Similarly, New Castle, Indiana, enacted a curfew following labor
riots in 1956. See Note, Rule by Martial Law in Indiana: The Scope of Executive Pow-
er, 31 IND. L.J. 456 (1956). See generally Note, Judicial Control of the Riot Curfew, 77
YALE L.J. 1560, 1561-62 (1968) [hereinafter Riot Curfew] (discussing the riot curfew
and its prudential and constitutional implications). The riot curfew can quell the emer-
gency but, like the juvenile curfew, does not address the underlying social issues that
cause crime and other violence. See infra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
21 In Thistlewood, for example, the Maryland Court of Appeals held constitutional
an Ocean City ordinance that imposed a Labor Day weekend nocturnal curfew on per-
sons under the age of 21. Thistlewood v. Trial Magistrate, 204 A.2d 688 (Md. 1964).
The ordinance recited the impetus for its enactment:
Ocean City suffered from the presence in the municipality of extremely disorderly
groups of minors, said disorder amounting almost to riots, requiring many police
officers, both local and state, and, on occasions, police dogs, to control the situa-
tion and maintain the peace of an otherwise normal and peaceful community, and
to protect the property and personal safety of visitors to and residents of Ocean
City.
Id. at 690. Reviewing the evidence and precedent, the court noted that during the Labor
Day weekend, the resort town "becomes swollen a hundredfold from its usual winter
size and to several times its average summer day size," and that the curfew would apply
to persons "who would not be using the streets for the ordinary or serious purposes they
most often would be if at home." Id. at 693. The court concluded that the curfew was a
short-term emergency measure to protect citizens, visitors, and the visiting minors, ap-
plicable on only the four crucial nights the legislature knew from experience were "the
dangerous nights of the year because marauding groups of minors, which formed be-
cause its members, not knowing what to do for pleasure or 'kicks,' after midnight,
remained and loitered on the streets or boardwalk, looking, in the vernacular, for trou-
ble." Id.
29 See Moorhead, 723 F. Supp. 1109 (denying injunctive relief against a nocturnal
curfew imposed in wake of a hurricane).
30 See, e.g., John Flinn & Eric Brazil, Huge Traffic Jam Snarls L.A., S.F. EXAMINER
Jan. 19, 1994, at Al; Chip Johnson, East Valley Focus: Van Nuys; Man Sentenced for
Trespass After Quake, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1994, at B3. One clergyman compared the
juvenile situation to an earthquake: "We are in a state of emergency .... If an earth-
quake hit the city, they would slap a curfew on in a minute. And we have a social
earthquake here." Clarence Johnson, Time to Get Tough, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 27, 1993, at
Al (quoting Rev. Amos Brown of the Third Baptist Church).
3 See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). The Court cited mili-
tary exigence as a justification for holding constitutional a law that excluded persons of
Japanese ancestry from the area in which their homes were located: "Nothing short of
apprehension by the proper military authorities of the gravest imminent danger to the
public safety can constitutionally justify excluding persons from the area in which their
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
laration of a state of emergency.
Arguably, the proposed distinction between emergency and juvenile
curfews collapses in the context of rampant crime. Few seriously can doubt
that juvenile crime and victimization rates are increasing and that crime
poses a serious threat to safety, health, and the exercise of liberties for both
minors and adults. 2 If gang and other juvenile violence poses a grave
threat, and the violence is dispersed across a large geographical area without
a pattern that would permit narrow confinement of the restriction to the pre-
cise exigency, the blanket law arguably becomes an emergency measure.33
Nevertheless, attempts to collapse the distinction between emergency
and blanket juvenile curfews have failed. In 1989, the District of Columbia
City Council declared a "state of emergency" and enacted a district-wide
juvenile curfew law. 4 The Temporary Emergency Curfew Act was to re-
main in effect for no longer than ninety days, as required by District law. 5
The impetus for the ordinance was the dramatic increase in the number of
minors arrested for possession or distribution of narcotics and the number of
those victimized by violent crime.36
The Federal District Court for the District of Columbia held that the
ordinance unconstitutionally reached innocent conduct and abridged funda-
mental freedoms. 37 The purported exigency was insufficient to justify the
homes are located." Id. at 218-19. The Court noted: "Compulsory exclusion of large
groups of citizens from their homes, except under circumstances of direst emergency
and peril, is inconsistent with our basic governmental institutions." Id. at 219-20; see
also Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1942) (holding constitutional as justi-
fied by "military necessity" a curfew confining "all persons of Japanese ancestry" resid-
ing in a military area to their places of residence daily between the hours of 8:00 p.m.
and 6:00 a.m.). Scholars criticize the cases as ethnically discriminatory. See, e.g.,
JACOBUS TEN BROEK ET AL., PREJUDICE, WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION (1954); Nanette
Dembitz, Racial Discrimination and the Military Judgment: The Supreme Court's
Korematsu and Endo Decisions, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 175 (1945); Eugene V. Rostow,
The Japanese American Cases-A Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 489 (1945); Patricia M.
Wald, 'One Nation Indivisible, with Liberty and Justice For All': Lessons from the
American Experience for New Democracies, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 283 (1990).
32 In 1983, 1175 juveniles were arrested for committing murder, 3914 for forcible
rape, 29,917 for aggravated assault, and 66,296 for all violent crimes. In 1992, the fig-
ures were 2680 for murder, 4882 for forcible rape, 48,383 for aggravated assault, and
104,137 for all violent crimes. FBI Uniform Crime Report.
3 See Martin P. Hogan, Note, Waters v. Barry: Juvenile Curfews-The D.C.
Council's "Quick Fix" for the Drug Crisis, I GEO. MASON U. CIv. RTS. L.J. 313
(1990).
34 D.C. Code Ann. § 1-229 (1990 Supp.), § 2-6 D.C. Law 8-13 (June 16, 1989), 36
D.C. Reg. 3373, amending the Short Term Curfew Emergency Act of 1989.
35 Id. § 8.
36 Id. § 3(a)(1)-(3); see Hogan, supra note 33, at 314.
37 Waters v. Barry, 711 F. Supp. 1125 (D.D.C. 1989).
956 [Vol. 4:3
JUVENILE CURFEW: UNCONSTITUTIONAL IMPRISONMENT
breadth of the restriction. "The Act casts ... aside [the fundamental free-
doms of movement and association] like so much straw."38 The court rec-
ognized that the "crippling effects of crime demand stern responses,"39 but
declared that the District had chosen to address the problem "through means
that are stern to the point of unconstitutionality."4
The fallacy with any argument conflating juvenile and emergency cur-
few measures lies in both the factual predicates and the legal consequences.
Justifiably transforming a blanket provision into an essential emergency
measure requires extreme conditions combined with extraordinary care in
drafting; only rarely can a juvenile law satisfy these requisites.
1. Factual Bases
Emergency curfews, in stark contrast to blanket laws, typically are sup-
ported by substantial evidence detailing the nature and extent of the exigen-
cy and the justifications for declaring an emergency.41 The laws frequently
are predicated on an executive or legislative declaration of a state of emer-
gency42 and are reevaluated periodically to ensure that the exigency contin-
31 id. at 1134.
39 Id. at 1135.
40 Id.
41 See, e.g., United States v. Chalk, 441 F.2d 1277, 1281-83 (4th Cir.) (describing
the nature of the riots, the level of tension, and the destruction to person and property),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 943 (1971); Davis v. Justice Court, 89 Cal. Rptr. 409, 411 (Ct.
App. 1970) (detailing threats, complaints, property damage, and specific instances of
criminal misconduct); State v. Boles, 240 A.2d 920, 925 (Conn. Cir. Ct. 1967) (relating
the circumstances and breadth of the riot and stating that "[o]nly the use of modern
police weaponry broke up what was certainly a dangerous situation"); Glover v. District
of Columbia, 250 A.2d 556, 561 (D.C. 1969) (citing statistics verifying the number of
buildings and housing units damaged or destroyed, persons dead and injured, and prop-
erty damage). The stated proposition that emergency curfews are supported by substan-
tial evidence, however, is not without exception. In Hirabayashi, the Court relied on a
public proclamation reciting that the circumstances of war following the bombing of
Pearl Harbor "require[] as a matter of military necessity the establishment of certain
regulations pertaining to all enemy aliens and all persons of Japanese ancestry with-
in ... Military Areas." Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 88 (1942). The
Court's analysis collapses for at least two reasons. First, "enemy aliens" presumably
were encompassed within the parameters of existing laws sufficient to meet the exigen-
cy. Second, the Court did not review any evidence, outside of hunch or intuition, tend-
ing to indicate a high correlation between enemy aliens and persons of Japanese ances-
try. See also Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 218-20 (1944).
42 See, e.g., Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216-17 (describing executive order reciting ne-
cessity of protecting against espionage and authorizing Secretary of War or a military
commander to prescribe movement restrictions); Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 85-88 (de-
scribing executive order reciting necessity of protecting against espionage and authoriz-
ing Secretary of War or military commander to prescribe movement restrictions and
1996]
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ues to exist so that the restriction does not exceed the proclaimed necessi-
ty. 43 The crises that animate these laws challenge the very survival of the
community and make impossible the conduct of normal business and the
endeavors of normal life."
Juvenile curfews, on the other hand, usually are substantiated by only
broad proclamations regarding juvenile crime and victimization, incomplete
statistics, and anecdotal evidence.45 In the Dallas litigation, for example,
the city failed to provide precise data to support its curfew,46 offering only
anecdotal evidence and incomplete and noncomparative reports of juvenile
crime and victimization. At trial, witnesses related their personal knowledge
that gang and drug problems paralyzed law enforcement and that minors
committed some crimes in public at night.47 Only at a second hearing did
the city present any statistics, which the federal district court analyzed and
substantially discounted.4"
issue proclamations of military necessity; congressional law criminalizing violations of
proclamations); Davis, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 410 (noting that director of disaster office, pur-
suant to county ordinance, proclaimed state of emergency); Glover, 250 A.2d at 558-59
(detailing factual basis upon which pursuant to District Code, commissioners determined
emergency situation existed); cf Chase v. Twist, 323 F. Supp. 749, 767 (E.D. Ark.
1970) (rejecting a curfew on the basis that "it does not take much time to enact
'emergency' ordinances").
41 See e.g., Chalk, 441 F.2d at 1278 (noting that mayor declared and reimposed
curfew on a daily basis upon finding a state of emergency); Boles, 240 A.2d at 922-23
(describing how mayor imposed curfew upon daily evaluation and reevaluation of con-
ditions).
44 See Hogan, supra note 33, at 315.
"' See, e.g., Ruff v. Marshall, 438 F. Supp. 303, 306 (M.D. Ga. 1977) (observing
that "[s]urely, mere reports of juvenile delinquency and civil disorders are insufficient
to justify an ongoing blanket curfew"); Allen v. City of Bordentown, 524 A.2d 478, 483
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1987) (noting that "nothing in the ordinance provides any
basis for the selection of any particular time span for the curfew"). The paucity of evi-
dence does not support the constitutional requirement that restrictions on fundamental
rights be narrowly tailored and necessary to accomplish a compelling governmental
interest. See infra part V.C.2.
' The Dallas curfew is described in detail in part III.
Qutb v. City of Dallas, No. CA 3-91-CV-1310-R, slip op. at 16-17 (N.D. Tex.
Aug. 10, 1992), rev'd sub nom. Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. de-
nied, 114 S. Ct. 2134 (1994).
4' The court noted that the evidence represented merely the number of arrests that
were made during curfew hours in public places with nothing to indicate the time the
offense actually occurred, as the records are more reflective of the time at which the
officer completed the report. Qutb, No. CA 3-91-CV-1310-R, slip op. at 36. The court
added that the evidence presented by the city was not overwhelming:
Moreover, of the supposed 494 arrests of juveniles during curfew hours, only 316
occurred in 'public places,' as defined by the curfew, and 60 were for runaway
minors (an offense that is outside the objective of the curfew). Thus, for the five-
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Other courts have taken, or rejected taking, judicial notice of the rising
crime rate. In City of Panora v. Simmons,49 the court reasoned that "'courts
should at least know what everyone else knows,' and it is common knowl-
edge that drug usage among minors has reached epidemic dimensions."5
Similarly, in City of Seattle v. Pullman,5 the dissent proposed taking judi-
cial notice that "children without purpose wandering about the streets at all
hours of the night often leads to mischief to their detriment and to the mem-
bers of society who, in some instances, become victims of mugging and
assaults, robberies and other violent crimes committed by juveniles."52
In Panora, the dissent found that "the city failed to prove any juvenile
crime in its community approaching a level of emergency,"53 implying that,
upon proper evidence, a juvenile curfew could collapse into an emergency
measure. 4 The issue, however, is not merely one of evidentiary sufficien-
cy. The common identifiers of the emergency law-spatial and temporal
limitation, close relation between scope and exigency, declaration of emer-
gency-inherently are incompatible with the necessary breadth of the juve-
nile curfew. Even an extreme escalation in public, nocturnal juvenile crime
is probably insufficient to justify a blanket curfew, which simply cannot be
month period between January and May, the City has a record of only 256 arrests
that occurred during curfew hours and in public places. Of these, 8% (26 offens-
es) involved harm to another individual, either by aggravated assault or aggravat-
ed robbery.
These figures tell very little about the number of juvenile offenders and vic-
tims of crime during curfew hours. One conclusion is certain, however. The evi-
dence is wholly inadequate to support an ordinance that promises to infringe upon
the fundamental rights of most minors in the City of Dallas.
Id. at 36-37.
9 445 N.W.2d 363 (Iowa 1989).
Id. at 369 (quoting Stenberg v. Buckley, 61 N.W.2d 452, 455 (Iowa 1954)). Even
if the propriety of taking judicial notice is conceded, that juvenile drug use is epidemic
is immaterial absent further data. The fact indicates nothing about the ages of drug
users, the places or times at which minors use drugs, or adult drug usage, distribution,
and ramifications.
"' 514 P.2d 1059 (Wash. 1973) (en banc). While rejecting a curfew ordinance on
grounds of vagueness and overbreadth, the court noted that "minor curfew ordinances
may be permissible where they are specific in their prohibition and necessary in curing
a demonstrable social evil." Id. at 1065.
52 Id. at 1067 (Hunter, J., dissenting).
City of Panora, 445 N.W.2d at 373 (Lavorato, J., dissenting).
5 Justice Marshall, however, dissenting from a denial of a writ of certiorari in
Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 429 U.S. 964 (1976), contrasted the juvenile and
the emergency ordinances, characterizing the law at issue as a "nonemergency" curfew.
Id. at 964 (Marshall, J., dissenting). He observed: "I have little doubt but that, absent a
genuine emergency, a curfew aimed at all citizens could not survive constitutional scru-
tiny." Id. at 965 (citing United States v. Chalk, 441 F.2d 1277 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 943 (1971)).
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limited to the geographical area of proven danger, to the period of exigency,
or to the perpetrators or targets of crime.
2. Legal Constraints
In addition to the factual constraints on recognition of blanket juvenile
curfews as a form of emergency curfew, the legal ramifications of blanket
and emergency curfew measures differ starkly. Although both the emergen-
cy and the juvenile curfew necessarily criminalize innocence by encompass-
ing some persons who would not violate any other penal provision, the net
cast by the blanket ordinance is, by definition, wider and more indiscrim-
inate.55 Consequently, analyses of the nexus between the end and the se-
lected means for purposes of strict constitutional scrutiny radically di-
verge.56 The blanket curfew interdicts more innocent activity for a longer
period of time. Further, the type of exigency that makes ordinary life, and
thus alternative measures, impossible does not typify the blanket provision.
In any event, the "emergency" blanket curfew law poses at the very
least a constitutional conundrum. Legitimate emergency curfews tend to be
constitutional, while blanket curfews can only very rarely and under the
most extreme circumstances survive constitutional scrutiny.57 The blanket
law possesses many of the determinative elements of an emergency curfew,
but is, within its operative geographical area and personal effect, blanket in
application. Thus, it can be constitutional if and only if it possesses all or
most of the characteristics that render constitutional the narrowly confined
emergency curfew while possessing few or none of the characteristics that
render unconstitutional the blanket law.58
II. PRUDENTIAL ARGUMENTS
A. Saving Lives
Curfews possess a strong superficial appeal. Arguably, or at least in
theory, they save lives. This rationale is compelling: "We don't know how
" See Riot Curfew, supra note 27, at 1564-66.
16 See infra part V.C.2.
5 See infra notes 283-85 and accompanying text.
's For example, Austin, Texas implemented a "6th Street" ordinance that may tran-
scend the dichotomy of these analytical constructs. With the concurrence of the local
ACLU chapter, the city council enacted a curfew to address continuing problems of
nocturnal crime and disorder in a circumscribed area near the University of Texas. Al-
though not limited in duration, the interdiction of the law is confined to the small geo-
graphical area that experience proved tended to be presently and continually tumultuous,
if not dangerous. See AUSTIN, TEX., MUN. CODE § 10-7 (1991).
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many lives the curfew will save. But if it saves one, if it protects that four-
year-old, if it says to them, 'The streets [are] not the place for you,' then
it's time for a curfew., 59
Curfews arguably reduce juvenile crime and juvenile victimization
through a very simple means-proscribing juveniles' presence on public
streets and public property. If juveniles are confined to their homes, they
cannot commit or be victimized by crime-at least public crime. To some,
the small price of encumbering many young lives is worth the benefit of
saving others.6" "'We cannot afford to lose another child."' 61
In addition, proponents argue that a curfew imposes parental responsibil-
ity: "The curfew [is] not so much a case of kids losing their freedom, but of
parental rights to responsibility being restored., 62 The curfew gives parents
a "backup., 63 As former Dallas Chief of Police William Rathburn argued,
"Parents also need an ordinance. Parents need to be reminded of their re-
sponsibility to control the behavior of their kids."' "[A]nyone that argues
that it should solely be the parents' responsibility to set curfews and keep
their kids at home just does not realize the extent to which parental authori-
ty has been eroded., 65
Some proponents also think the curfew is the answer to social weakness-
es in the family:
An archaic welfare system has turned the intact family into
an impediment to receiving federal money, television and
movies have turned the father into a buffoon and mom into
either a shrill witch or dysfunctional ditz, and advertising,
which is increasingly designed to speak to the child in the
Qutb v. City of Dallas, No. CA 3-91-CV-1310-R, slip op. at 16 (N.D. Tex. Aug
10, 1992) (quoting Edna Pemberton, Co-Chairperson, Oak Cliff Concerned Citizens
Against Crime), rev'd sub nom. Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488 (5th Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 2134 (1994).
60 Teen Curfew, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Dec. 10, 1993, at 24A.
61 Ann B. Gesalman & Sylvia Martinez, Curfew for Teens Upheld, DALLAS MORN-
ING NEWS, Nov. 23, 1993, at 10A (quoting Edna Pemberton).
62 Ann Melvin, City Curfew Is a Victory for Parents, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
Nov. 27, 1993, at 31A.
63 Id.
4 Tracy Everbach, Judge Rules Proposed Teen Curfew Unlawful, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Aug. 11, 1992, at 8A. A Dallas city councilmember elaborated: "If a parent
cannot control their [sic] children, why should that child be unleashed upon the public?"
Lori Stahl, Dallas Panel Urges Curfew for Teens, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 21,
1991, at 1A, 4A (quoting Councilmember Al Lipscomb).
65 Melvin, supra note 62, at 31A.
1996]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
family, implies that he is the decisionmaker; the parent mere-
ly the obligatory money earner.66
As one Dallas city councilmember stated, "This is a family issue. The big-
gest problem is the breakdown of the American family. If mama and daddy
care about where the kids are at midnight, then maybe the kids will do bet-
ter.",67 The governmental curfew, therefore, is thought essential because the
traditional parental curfew is anachronistic: "We're living in a changing
world. Mobility, materialism, rejection of responsibility and greed have
almost collapsed family life.,
68
The social change required to fundamentally alter the impulses of crimi-
nal behavior is both expensive and slow, possibly too slow:
Who can deny that our concept of social order and social
structure is changing? In each of the summers since 1963,
riots in all parts of this nation have become nothing less than
the vogue. Too often, if a large city does not experience a
riot or two, it occasions the inquiry, 'Why not?' or the accu-
sation that the community is apathetic. Certainly this is a
new trend that must of necessity be met with new remedial
and preferably preventive measures. Obviously, the most
desirable and preventive measure is to labor hard to make
each community an open community. But since this cannot
be done in one day, there is no justification for permitting
lawless disorder. The existence of injustice to our fellow
human beings can never bring us to condone violence, law-
lessness, hate, arson and destruction, for this would be the
beginning of the end of our hoped-for free society.69
The impetus for the Dallas curfew reflected this sentiment. A coalition
of African-American citizens expressed fatigue with rampant juvenile
crime-particularly drug distribution and gang violence-and demanded a
curfew to ameliorate the blight. °
66 Id.
67 Dallas Passes Curfew for Youths as Resident Deplore [sic] Rise in Crime, N.Y.
TIMES, June 15, 1991, at Al [hereinafter Dallas Passes Curfew] (quoting
Councilmember Charles Tandy).
68 Tottie Ellis, Curfews Help Cities Fight Growing Crime, USA TODAY, June 18,
1991, at 12A.
69 State v. Boles, 240 A.2d 920, 924 (Conn. Cir. Ct. 1967).
70 One city councilmember testified at trial, "I have personally observed the gangs
and the crack houses. I've seen the kids that should be at home asleep or studying out
there being lookout people for the drug pushers." Victor Inzunza, Both Sides Rest in
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Yet neither the coalition nor the council nor the police7" viewed the
curfew as a panacea. They understood "that the curfew [was] not a cure-all
but another stopgap to save the lives of ... young people."" It
"'establishe[d] a basis to protect children who could be victimized' because
it could 'help cut down on the involvement of minors in wrong activities[,J
benefit[ing] parents by providing' support for their efforts 'to keep younger
members of the family at home' during curfew hours."73 The curfew could
"'aid ... single parents"' and "'minimize the peer pressure"' that often
causes youths to commit crimes.7
In Dallas, the coalition founder deemed the situation critical and envi-
sioned the curfew as an ameliorative solution: "We realize[d] that to save
this generation of young people, there needed to be structure in their lives.
And that is when we sat down and realized that a curfew is a piece of the
puzzle."'75 To proponents, the curfew was not penal but solicitous: it was
not a "penalty," but protection from the temptations of the street.76 Youths
require protection; curfews can provide such protection.
At the time of this writing, the curfew has been in effect in Dallas for
approximately one year, and the police claim a stark reduction in juvenile
crime.77 The police department cites statistics reflecting a dramatic decline
in both the number of juveniles taken into custody during curfew hours and
the number of violent offenses against juveniles.7" The chief of police ad-
Suit Over Dallas Curfew, FORT WORTH STAR TELEGRAM, July 24, 1991, at B4 (quoting
Councilmember Al Lipscomb). The Oak Cliff Concerned Citizens Against Crime, under
the leadership of Edna Pemberton, an African-American female, was composed primari-
ly of ministers and parishioners of a predominantly African-American church. The co-
alition petitioned the city council and city councilmembers and spoke to the public
safety committee and the council, exerting a strong influence on the council.
"' The Chief of Police, William Rathburn, supported the ordinance. Although mem-
bers of the force, speaking in confidence, expressed opposition, none was willing to
challenge the ordinance in public. See Qutb v. City of Dallas, No. CA 3-91-CV-1310-R,
slip op. at 18 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 10, 1992), rev'd sub nom. Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488
(5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2134 (1994).
72 Gesalman & Martinez, supra note 61, at 10A (quoting Edna Pemberton, Co-
Chairperson, Oak Cliff Concerned Citizens Against Crime).
7 Qutb, No. CA 3-91-CV-1310-R, slip op. at 17 (quoting Dr. Charles Hunter, minis-
ter and sociologist).
I d. (quoting Councilmember Diane Ragsdale).
7' Dallas Passes Curfew, supra note 67, at 12A (quoting Edna Pemberton).
76 Lauren Robinson, Dallas Eyes 11 p.m. Youth Curfew, DALLAS TIMES HERALD,
Apr. 17, 1991, at A12.
Christopher Lee, Dallas Youth Crime Down Since Curfew, Chief Says, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Jan. 6, 1996, at lA.
7H Id. at 5A.
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mits, and the regional director, Carrie Sperling, argues, however, that the
curfew could not have been the entire impetus for the reduction.79
B. Constricting Liberty
Opponents attack curfew laws on at least three central foundations: they
are inefficacious, they burden scarce police resources, and they unconsti-
tutionally restrict liberty.8" As the regional director of the North Texas
ACLU stated, a "curfew is not going to make it safer, but it is going to
make us a lot less free." 8'
Concededly, curfews may save a few lives, and the death of any child is
tragic. Nevertheless, to use this as the primary justification for a law that
removes all juveniles from public places during a substantial portion of the
day is analogous to clearing the streets of all cars or reducing the speed
limit to twenty miles per hour to reduce the substantial number of child
deaths caused by automobile accidents.82 Curfew laws are essentially cos-
metic solutions to systemic problems. They require fewer resources than are
necessary to reach the underlying social problems that contribute to juvenile
crime. They are, according to opponents, desperate measures that allow
cities to appear tough on crime.83 The curfew is "a quick-fix, do-nothing
solution that provides cover for politicians to say they are doing something
about the crime problem."84 Curfews are, effectively, political responses to
perplexing and expansive social and criminal issues:
[Officials of curfew cities] say they are protecting their
youths, forcing parents to control their kids and making the
streets safer.
71 Id. at 1A, 5A.
"' One author made five objections to curfew ordinances: (1) the peak of juvenile
criminal activity is in the early hours of the evening; (2) only a small portion of the
juvenile population engages in criminal activity and the curfew is a "shotgun" approach;
(3) effective enforcement stretches beyond the physical capability of police forces; (4)
curfews shift the focus of attention from more pressing problems of delinquency; and
(5) the deterrent effect is minimal. See Curfew Ordinances, supra note 2, at 68-96.
8" See Melvin, supra note 61, at 31A (quoting ACLU regional director Joe Cook).
82 See Ellis, supra note 68, at 12A.
83 See statement of Dallas City Councilmember Glenn Box opposing passage of the
curfew ordinance. Box, considered in the Dallas community as politically conservative,
was the only member to oppose the curfew. Box argued that the ordinance was patently
unconstitutional.
84 Ann B. Gesalman, City Wins Another Round in Fight to Enforce Teen Curfew,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 22, 1994, at 32A (quoting Joe Cook, Executive Director,
American Civil Liberties Union of North Texas).
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They aren't. They are just making baby sitters of cops.
They are toying with the constitutional rights of youth.
And for what? To keep teens off the streets when most
crime is committed by adults.
Cities that want to delude voters into thinking they are
fighting crime can pass teen curfews. It might fool some.
But cities that really want to stop crime will concentrate
on arresting and prosecuting people who commit violent
crimes instead of harassing teenagers.
Cities that want to keep kids out of trouble will create
jobs and recreation for them, not arrest them for hanging out.
Cities that really want to protect their young will seek
those at risk in high-crime neighborhoods and counsel them,
not make teens prisoners in their homes.
And cities that care will provide services that help par-
ents, especially working single parents, cope.85
The simple fact, argue proponents, is that youths are in public at night be-
cause of a basic breakdown in the family and other social structures that a
facile curfew cannot cure. 6
Opponents further argue that curfews are infirm conceptually. 7 That a
curfew will deter criminal activity when extant criminal laws with penalties
considerably more severe are ineffective is a strong assumption.88 As the
lone dissenter on the Dallas City Council noted, "If someone is robbing or
stealing, telling them there is a curfew is laughable."8 A curfew only pun-
ishes the law-abiding.
The curfew strikes an exacting blow on law-abiding youths. It addresses
a crime problem as if it were a youth problem. It presumes youths to be
guilty and conveniently ignores the voices of the disenfranchised. It penaliz-
es juveniles less for their action than for their status," and alienates them
85 Curfews on Kids, supra note 3, at 12A.
81 See Henry Tatum, The Wide Blanket of a Curfew, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Apr.
24, 1991, at 20A.
s' Everbach, supra note 64, at 8A.
88 Id.
89 Id. (quoting Dallas City Councilmember Glenn Box). "'If a kid is willing to carry
an Uzi, he certainly is not going to abide by a curfew."' Id. (quoting Sabrina Qutb,
plaintiff in the Dallas litigation).
' For this reason, curfews arguably violate Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660
(1962), which proscribed criminalizing status offenses. The difficulty with this argument
is that those constrained by a curfew are doing something, though possibly very little.
The youths are, at the very least, remaining in public during the proscribed hours. The
distinction between conduct and status is tenuous in this context, but a court would not
likely overturn a curfew law on this ground.
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from police.9 As one youth explained, "It makes me feel like I'm in a
country that's Army-controlled, and I'll get shot if I go out.
92
Opponents also take issue with the effect curfews will have on the allo-
cation of police resources. Police forces already are stretched to the limits,
and shifting energy to a "non-crime" wastes precious energy and resources.
Further, every moment consumed in questioning a person for a potential
curfew violation is a moment not available for responding to other more
urgent demands.
Finally, opponents concede that children generally should be home at
night but object, prudentially and constitutionally, to the government acting
as decisionmaker. 93 The proponents' argument that a curfew enhances pa-
rental responsibility rests on the dubious, if not irrational, assumption that a
governmentally imposed curfew will cause recalcitrant parents to care. Con-
versely, a curfew "ignores the many thousands of families for whom the
ideal of family unity and parental control still lives."94
Alternatives to curfews, though more expensive, do exist. For example,
several months after passing the curfew, the City of Dallas hired a juvenile
coordinator to talk to troubled youth and parents and implement beneficial
programs. Additionally, less expensive options may be viable. Vancouver,
British Columbia, dispersed loitering teens by playing, twenty-four hours a
day, the ballads of Perry Como and Barry Manilow.95 In addition, the 1994
federal crime bill included proposals for youth midnight basketball,96 a pro-
gram that may be cut in a new crime bill.97 Thus, the curfew may be as
unnecessary as it is unconstitutional.
See, e.g., Catalina Camia, Teen Curfew Opponents Rally Peers, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, June 9, 1992, at 25A ("'Youths are already leery of dealing with police. This
ordinance will totally alienate youths from police. If the city thinks at 11:01 p.m. I'll be
ready to break into a 7-Eleven and steal something . . . then there is no trust."' (quoting
William Fisher, plaintiff in the Dallas litigation)).
9 Stacey Freedenthal, Upcoming Curfew on Minds of Teens, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Nov. 23, 1993, at 10A (quoting Darryl Reif, age 16, of Dallas).
9 The constitutional objections are detailed infra parts IV and V.
Qutb v. City of Dallas, No. CA 3-91-CV-1310-R, slip op. at 28 (N.D. Tex. Aug.
10, 1992) (quoting Waters v. Barry, 711 F. Supp. 1121, 1137 (D.D.C. 1989)), rev'd sub
nom. Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2134 (1994).
' See Steve Marmel, Skip the Curfew; Use Muzak, USA TODAY, June 18, 1991, at
12A. Marmel humorously suggested solutions. At drag areas, he proposed hiring parents
to drive Lincoln Towncars back and forth. Id. At fast food places, he suggested forcing
youths to eat: "The digestive process takes 20 minutes. They'll leave soon after." Id. At
"make-out" places, he proposed bellowing the theme from Love Boat behind cardboard
cut-outs of Captain Stubing and other cast members. Id.
42 U.S.C. § 11903(a) (1994).
9 See Elizabeth Kolbert, Private Lobbysist for Public Safety; Adam Walinsky, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 30, 1994, § 6, at 42; Katherine Q. Seelye, The New Crime Bill: Overview,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1994, at Al.
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III. THE DALLAS EXPERIENCE
A. The Ordinance
On June 12, 1991, the Dallas city council enacted a juvenile curfew
ordinance98 prohibiting all persons under the age of seventeen years from
remaining on public streets between the hours of 11 p.m. and 6 a.m. from
Sundays through Thursdays, and 12 a.m. and 6 a.m. on Fridays and Satur-
days.99 The ordinance defined "remain" as "to linger or stay unnecessarily"
or to "fail to leave premises when requested to do so."'" The enactment
imposed penal sanctions on minors, parents, and owners and operators of
businesses. ''
The ordinance included numerous exceptions to prosecution." 2 Thus, a
minor who violated the ordinance could raise affirmative defenses at trial if
she was, when arrested, accompanied by her parent; on an errand at the
direction of her parent and using a "direct route;" ' 3 involved in interstate
travel; engaged in employment activity; involved in an emergency; on the
sidewalk abutting her house or the house of a next-door neighbor; attending
or returning home by a direct route from an "official"'" school or reli-
gious activity; exercising First Amendment rights; or emancipated. 5
The ordinance provided an elaborate enforcement mechanism. An officer
finding a minor in violation was directed to (1) ascertain the minor's name
and address;"° (2) issue a written warning of violation; and (3) order the
9 Original Dallas Ordinance, supra note 18, § 31-33(a)(2), (b)(1).
9 Id.
Id. § 31-33(a)(11).
Io0 Id. § 31-33(b)(l)-(3).
102 Id. § 31-33(b)(3)(c). In the typical curfew law, exemptions are styled "exceptions"
and carry a different meaning than defenses. An exception negates any violation, where-
as a defense allows the accused affirmatively to raise the issue in a prosecution.
13 The ordinance defined "direct route" as the shortest path of travel through a pub-
lic place to reach a final destination without any detour or stop along the way." Id.
§ 31-33(a)(3). Plaintiffs challenged this term, among others, as unconstitutionally vague.
Qutb v. City of Dallas, No. CA 3-91-CV-1310-R, slip op. at 16-17 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 10,
1992), rev'd sub nom. Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.
Ct. 2134 (1994).
104 Original Dallas Ordinance § 31-33(c)(1)(G). The ordinance did not define "offi-
cial." The term is, arguably, vague. It may mean school-sponsored or simply school-
affiliated.
105 Original Dallas Ordinance, supra note 18, § 31-33(c); Qutb, No. CA 3-91-CV-
1310-R, slip op. at 16-17.
106 This prong of the enforcement mechanism potentially raises Fourth Amendment
search and seizure issues and Fifth Amendment compulsory self-incrimination issues.
One objective of the curfew is to eviscerate the commands of the Fourth Amendment,
namely, to allow an enforcement officer to confront and question youths suspected of
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minor to go home promptly by a direct route."°7 An officer could take a
minor into custody if the minor had received two previous written warnings,
or if the officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the minor was en-
gaging in delinquent conduct under Texas law.108
In June 1992, while the litigation was pending, the city substantially
amended the ordinance."° The amended law incorporated recitations of
predicate findings, including the increase in juvenile violence, the peculiar
susceptibility of youths to unlawful activities, and the obligation of the city
to protect minors.110 The city refined the definitions, adding "guardian"
and "step-parent" to the definition of "parent," deleting the term "unneces-
sarily" from the definition of "remain,111 changing the term "direct route"
to "without any detour or stop," rewriting the defense for school or other
criminal activity when the officer otherwise is without the requisite probable cause or
reasonable suspicion. The curfew is, in this sense, a manufactured crime specifically
designed to circumvent constitutional commands. The Constitution, and specifically the
Fourth Amendment, are ephemeral if they do not proscribe this type of legislation. See
generally infra part V.B.1. On the other hand, as the court in Waters recognized in
rejecting the argument based on Fourth Amendment grounds, the curfew itself may
provide the requisite suspicion:
The plaintiffs' argument reflects, in essence, an attempt to find in the Fourth
Amendment an absolute right to be free from searches and seizures, a right that
cannot be limited by the government's power to criminalize certain forms of be-
havior. The Court finds no such absolute right in the Fourth Amendment. Instead,
as the very language of the Fourth Amendment provides, a right to be free from
such intrusions exists only so long as there is not probable cause to believe that
an offense has been committed. . . . Were [the curfew] not otherwise unconstitu-
tional, the proscriptions of the Act would provide, in fact, valid substantive refer-
ences for determining the presence or absence of probable cause in a given case.
... So long as the officer could reasonably have believed that the individual
looked "young," the search, seizure or arrest would take place on the basis of
probable cause and no Fourth Amendment violation would occur.
Waters v. Barry, 711 F. Supp. 1125, 1138 (D.D.C. 1989). Similarly, the curfew's en-
forcement mechanism requires the officer to obtain the precise information that will
incriminate the youth or the parent. Amended Dallas Ordinance, supra note 18, § 31-
33(d)(1)(A)-(C). No court yet has ruled on this potential Fifth Amendment issue.
107 Id. § 31-33(d)(1)(A)-(C).
108 Id. § 31-33(d)(2)(A)-(B). This aspect of the ordinance raised procedural due pro-
cess issues. See infra part IV.
109 See Amended Dallas Ordinance, supra note 18. Hereinafter, textual references to
the Dallas "curfew" or "ordinance" are to the amended ordinance, unless the context
indicates otherwise.
110 Id. at Preface.
Id. § 31-33(a)(4), (7), (9).
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civic activities," 2 and eliminating the warning procedure."' The amend-
ed ordinance was substituted into the pending litigation." 4
B. The Case at Trial
On July 3, 1991, the ACLU of North Texas filed a pre-enforcement
facial class action" 5 challenge, invoking the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Four-
teenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and requesting a tem-
porary restraining order and temporary and permanent injunctive relief."6
The parties agreed that the ordinance would not be enforced pending resolu-
tion of the issues raised in the litigation.
At a hearing on the merits," 7 each minor plaintiff who testified stated
that he or she was involved in numerous charitable, community, and enter-
tainment activities that sometimes required presence on public streets during
curfew hours."8 The minors testified to the scope of the restriction and
'- Id. § 31-33(c)(1)(B), (D), (G).
"1 Id. § 31-33(d). Officers were instructed to ascertain the age of the apparent of-
fender and the reason for remaining in a public place and to take enforcement action
only upon reasonable belief that an offense had occurred and that no defense was pres-
ent. Qutb v. City of Dallas, No. CA 3-91-CV-1310-R, slip op. at 16-17 (N.D. Tex. Aug.
10, 1992), rev'd sub nom. Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 2134 (1994). The amendment likely cured the procedural defects inherent in
the original warning procedure, but did not rectify the problem of the effect of "defens-
es" under state law or the conceptual problem inherent in ascertaining the existence of a
defense.
114 Plaintiffs argued by written motion that the city amended the ordinance in re-
sponse to their complaints, and, consequently, they were entitled to attorneys fees as a
prevailing party under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1993). The court agreed and awarded 75% of
the fees and expenses incurred from the time of the initiation of the litigation to the
time of the amendment. The court, in an unpublished opinion, affirmed the judgment
awarding fees but cut the amount to 30%. Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488, 491 (5th Cir.
1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2134 (1994).
"' The class action certification prevents the action from becoming moot when all
minor plaintiffs reach the age of 17. See County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S.
44, 51-52 (1991); Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 256 n.3 (1984); Sosna v. Iowa, 419
U.S. 393 (1975).
116 Qutb, 11 F.3d 488. Much of the following trial information is based on the au-
thor's personal knowledge developed while she co-litigated Qutb on behalf of plaintiffs.
"" The judge consolidated the hearing on the temporary injunction with the hearing
on the merits pursuant to FED. R. CIv. P. 65(a)(2).
"' The activities included involvement with Amnesty International, Children's Hospi-
tal, Presbyterian Hospital, March of Dimes, Cerebral Palsy, mock trial, city orchestra,
school council, crime prevention block parties, community theatre, teen theatre, opera,
symphony, Shakespeare in the Park, youth dances, youth clubs, babysitting, studying
with friends, and major league baseball games in a neighboring community. Personal
knowledge of the author.
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offered opinions regarding the impact of the ordinance on daily life.119
The named plaintiff was a single mother of one of the minor plaintiffs
who strongly believed that the curfew restricted her constitutional liberty to
raise her child. 2 ° She testified that, in consultation with her daughter, she
imposed a curfew that her child could breach if she called with an explana-
tion. 2' She stated that she gave her child responsibility commensurate
with the child's increasing maturity and that she deemed this critical to the
child's development into a responsible adult.'22
Attorneys for the defendants attempted to prove that any restriction on
liberties was minimal. They argued that none of the activities was funda-
mental, that the enactment satisfied rational basis review, and that the cur-
few merely required that youths return home a little early or be accompa-
nied by a parent or guardian.'23
The city adduced evidence that juvenile crime increases proportionally
with age between ten and sixteen years of age but did not provide compara-
tive data on the crime rate for persons older than sixteen.'24 Plaintiffs
countered that the city's evidence largely was anecdotal and that the bare
statistics showed that juveniles committed no more than two to three percent
of nocturnal public crime.'25 Further, plaintiffs argued that the evidence of
the number of crimes committed by juveniles did not signify the level of
nocturnal or public juvenile crime.'26 The city introduced evidence of the
number of juvenile arrests, which, plaintiffs contended, revealed little about
the nocturnal juvenile public crime rate. 27
Plaintiffs adduced evidence that the crime rate was highest among per-
sons seventeen to twenty-five and that many offenses occurred in the
home. 2 ' Additional evidence indicated that more assaults were committed
by relatives and acquaintances than by strangers, and that a substantial pro-
portion of assaults, including sexual assaults, occurred in the home. One
police sergeant confidentially opined that the school hours were the most
dangerous for juveniles.'29
Chief of Police William Rathburn and the police sergeant in charge of
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against such minors as the plaintiffs who abided by state criminal law.13°
Rather, they admitted, the ordinance was a law enforcement "tool" that gave
police officers probable cause to stop suspicious youths when the officers
otherwise would be constrained by the Fourth Amendment.' Rathburn
testified that officers would be trained to stop only those suspected of
wrongdoing,'32 which, plaintiffs countered, raised issues of selective en-
forcement.'33
The court concluded that the liberty to associate freely is fundamen-
tal,34 that the activities at issue implicated that liberty interest, 135 and
that the ordinance impermissibly burdened that freedom. 136 The court also
concluded that free movement was a fundamental liberty 137 and that the
ordinance unconstitutionally intruded on this liberty.'38 The court proceed-
ed to analyze the relative rights of minors under Bellotti v. Baird39 and
found that none of the factors applied. 4 Consequently, the judge found no
justification for considering the rights of minors differently from the rights
of adults.'
41
In analyzing plaintiffs' equal protection challenge, the court scrupulously
reviewed the evidence presented at the hearing, detailing the defects in the
statistical data presented. 42 The court discussed the dangers posed to mi-
nors by gang violence and crack houses, but found that the ordinance was
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 See lnzunza, supra note 70, at 3A.
133 Personal knowledge of the author. Selective enforcement is discussed infra part
V.E.2.
134 Qutb v. City of Dallas, No. CA 3-91-CV-1310-R, slip op. at 21 (N.D. Tex. Aug.
10, 1992), rev'd sub nom. Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 2134 (1994). The court relied on Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 23-24
(1988), and Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (plurality
opinion). Although Stanglin reaffirmed a fundamental right to freedom of association,
see Stanglin, 490 U.S. at 24-25, the district court's application of Stanglin to the facts at
issue in Qutb is tenuous.
135 Qutb, No. CA 3-91-CV-1310-R, slip op. at 22.
136 Id.
137 Id. at 23.
138 Id. at 30-34.
.3' 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (declaring unconstitutional a statute requiring pregnant mi-
nors seeking abortions to obtain consent of parents or judicial approval following paren-
tal notification). The plurality decision enunciated a tripartite framework for analyzing
the freedoms of minors relative to adults. See infra notes 248-49 and accompanying
text.
140 Qutb, No. CA 3-91-CV-1310-R, slip op. at 24-29. For a discussion of the Bellotti
test, see infra notes 248-52 and accompanying text.
41 Qutb, No. CA 3-91-CV-1310-R, slip op. at 29.
142 Id. at 35-37.
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not narrowly tailored to achieve the stated objectives and illogically and
naively assumed that persons inclined to engage in criminal activities would
be deterred by a governmentally imposed curfew. 143 The court concluded
that the distinction between minors and adults was unnecessary to achieve a
reduction in juvenile crime and victimization rates and expressed concern
that the law would be selectively enforced.'44 Finally, the court concluded
that the ordinance violated fundamental rights to privacy in childrearing
under the federal and Texas constitutions.
45
C. The Case on Appeal
The city appealed the judgment to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit, arguing that the ordinance did not restrict fundamental
rights, and, consequently, the "rational basis" standard of review ap-
plied.146 The city further argued that the ordinance imposed only a mini-
mal, constitutionally insignificant burden on liberties.
The Fifth Circuit assumed, for purposes of equal protection analysis, that
the right to move about freely in public was fundamental and, thus, strictly
scrutinized the ordinance. 47 Plaintiffs conceded that the asserted govern-
mental interests-reducing juvenile crime and victimization-were compel-
ling, 4' leaving for resolution the scope of the nexus between the stated
governmental interest and the classification created by the ordinance.'49
The court concluded that the ordinance was narrowly tailored to achieve the
stated goals. 5
Reviewing the statistical and data-based evidence, the Fifth Circuit in-
ferred that certain offenses are "most likely" to occur at night. 5' The
court, however, did not, and could not, infer that these offenses most likely
occur in public.'
143 Id. at 37-38.
144 Id. at 38. The court further concluded that the ordinance violated the enhanced
guarantee of free speech under the Texas Constitution. Id. at 39.
145 Id. at 41.
146 Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488, 492 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2134
(1994). For a discussion of the various standards of review, see infra part V.A.
147 Qutb, 11 F.3d at 492.
148 Id. Specifically, the city asserted six governmental interests: (1) reducing the num-
ber of juvenile crime victims; (2) reducing injury accidents involving juveniles; (3)
reducing additional time for officers in the field; (4) providing additional options for
dealing with gang problems; (5) reducing juvenile peer pressure to stay out late; and (6)
assisting parents in the control of their children. Id. at 494 n.8.
I ld. at 492 n.6. The "nexus" requirement is discussed infra part V.C.2.
's Qutb, 11 F.3d at 495.
'I' Id. at 493.
152 Id.
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The court rejected the argument that precise data was essential to justify
a restriction on fundamental liberties:
Although the city was unable to provide precise data con-
cerning the number of juveniles who commit crimes during
the curfew hours, or the number of juvenile victims of
crimes committed during the curfew, the city nonetheless
provided sufficient data to demonstrate that the classification
created by the ordinance 'fits' the state's compelling inter-
est.
153
Curiously, the court then conflated the analytical inquiries, juxtaposing the
"nexus" test with the "compelling interest" requirement: "We will not, how-
ever, insist upon detailed studies of the precise severity, nature, and charac-
teristics of the juvenile crime problem in analyzing whether the ordinance
meets constitutional muster when it is conceded that the juvenile crime
problem ... constitutes a compelling state interest.' 154
The judges further found that the curfew was the least restrictive means
of accomplishing the expressed objectives. 55 The court noted that the ordi-
nance contained numerous "exceptions" to violation and that neither the
restrictions nor the exceptions could be viewed in isolation from each oth-
er.'56 "To be sure, the defenses are the most important consideration in de-
termining whether this ordinance is narrowly tailored."'57 The court con-
ceded that the ordinance would restrict some late-night activities of juve-
niles, because "[I]f indeed it did not ... there would be no purpose in en-
acting it.' 58 The court ruled, however, that, balanced against the compel-
ling interest, the impositions were "minor."' 59 The judges found that juve-
niles within the parameter of the curfew could still engage in their desired
activities."' The curfew merely required minors to curtail late-night activi-
ties, to be home at an earlier time, or to be accompanied by a parent or
guardian.16
153 Id.
154 Id. at 493 n.7. Accordingly, the court misperceived the issue. That the governmen-
tal interest is compelling is immaterial to the "fit" between the end and the means se-
lected. The most compelling of interests cannot dilute the nexus requirement of strict
scrutiny.
"' Id. at 493. The "least restrictive means" requirement and analysis is discussed
infra part V.C.2.
156 Qutb, 11 F.3d at 493.
'5' Id. at 493-94.
8' Id. at 494.
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The court easily disposed of the district court's conclusion that the ordi-
nance impermissibly burdened associational liberties, questioning whether,
under Dallas v. Stanglin,62 the ordinance implicated an associational inter-
est. 63 The court further noted that the ordinance excepted any protected
associational freedoms."6
The judges then discounted the testimony of the named plaintiff, holding
that the ordinance exerted only a minimal burden on fundamental rights to
parental privacy. 165 The court further concluded that the exceptions amelio-
rated any infringement. 166 Finally, the court readily disposed of the
plaintiffs' state constitutional arguments, finding nothing in the Texas Con-
stitution that warranted different treatment of the issues.67
The Fifth Circuit opinion frames the controversy. Across the nation,
substantial contentious diversity surrounds these and other constitutional is-
sues raised by juvenile curfews. 168 While opponents argue that curfews un-
constitutionally usurp fundamental rights to freedom of speech, freedom of
association, freedom of movement, parental privacy, and deny equal protec-
tion of the law, 169 defendants and proponents assert that First Amendment
rights are preserved by exceptions, that freedom of movement is not a fun-
damental liberty, and that any infringement of a constitutionally protected
162 490 U.S. 19 (1989) (holding that, because the Constitution did not protect any
"generalized right of social association," dance hall patrons did not possess a constitu-
tionally protected associational interest).
163 Qutb, 11 F.3d at 495 n.9.
'" Id.
165 Id. at 495-96. The nature of these liberties is discussed infra part V.D.
'6 Qutb, 11 F.3d at 495.
167 Id. at 495 n.9 (equal protection); id. at 496 n.10 (parental privacy).
16' Dade County, Florida recently enacted a curfew modeled after the Dallas ordi-
nance. The local ACLU chapter challenged the ordinance. An appellate court, ruling
contrary to precedent, upheld the ordinance. Metropolitan Dade County v. Pred, 665 So.
2d 252 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
169 Curfews also have been challenged as violating procedural due process. See infra
Part IV. In addition, curfews may infringe on the Fifth Amendment. Secondarily, cur-
few enactments arguably violate the mandate of Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979),
by compelling youths to carry identification and respond to police questioning regarding
a manufactured offense. Curfew enforcement mechanisms also mandate asking ques-
tions that require self-incrimination. Arguably, therefore, arrests cannot be effectuated
without providing the warnings prescribed by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Providing Miranda warnings, however, would significantly undermine enforcement. The
curfew enactment may, in this sense, collide with itself.
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freedom is minimal. 7" Thus, as juvenile curfews explode nationwide,"'
the status of the liberty, the standard of review, and the role of exceptions
are vigorously contested.'72
IV. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS: THE WARNING MECHANISM
Many legislative bodies attempt to ameliorate the severity of curfew
arrests by providing warning devices that function as predicates to custodial
arrest and prosecution. The original Dallas ordinance, for example, directed
an enforcement officer who found a youth in violation of the curfew to
issue a written warning and order the minor to go promptly home by a
direct route.'73 An official could take into custody a minor who had re-
ceived two previous written warnings or who the officer had reasonable
grounds to believe had committed delinquent conduct. 74
This and similar enforcement mechanisms deprive the minor of proce-
dural due process by denying a timely hearing, if any is held at all, on the
predicate offenses. The minor is, in effect, convicted of a penal offense by
the police officer on the street; the officer becomes prosecutor, judge, and
jury. If the minor receives only one or two warnings, her record is blem-
ished without any trial on the merits. If she receives a third warning and the
prior warnings are jurisdictional, she ultimately may receive a hearing that is
constitutionally untimely.
The failure to accord the accused a fair and timely hearing violates even
minimal standards of due process. 175 "'Punishment without issue or trial
[is] contrary to the usual and ordinarily indispensable hearing before judg-
ment, constituting due process .... "176 Further, the right to present evi-
dence is essential to the fair hearing required by the Due Process Clause and
is particularly fundamental when the proceeding may result in a finding of
170 Qutb, 11 F.3d at 493-96.
,71 The Dallas ACLU affiliate conservatively estimates that over 3000 communities
have curfew laws.
172 Dade County recently enacted a curfew modeled after the Dallas ordinance. The
local ACLU chapter challenged the ordinance. The courts in two cases ruling contrary
to precedent upheld the ordinance.
See Original Dallas Ordinance, supra note 18, § 31-33(d)(1)(B), (C).
174 Id. § 31-33(d)(2)(A), (B).
175 See Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 725 (1992); Ross v. Massachusetts, 414
U.S. 1080, 1081 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting to denial of certiorari); In re Oliver, 33
U.S. 257 (1948); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927); see also Reno v. Flores, 507
U.S. 292, 306-09 (1993) (finding due process satisfied by giving juvenile alien detained
on suspicion of being deportable a hearing before immigration judge); Gagnon v.
Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (finding denial of due process in failure to afford proba-
tioner preliminary or final hearing prior to revocation of probation).
176 Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 497-98 n.6 (1974) (quoting Cooke v. United
States, 267 U.S. 517, 536 (1925)).
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criminal guilt.177 Additionally, any undue postponement not required by
exigent circumstances violates due process. 7 1
Thus, the warning mechanism, although laudable, is constitutionally
intolerable. The defect is particularly egregious when the enactment offers
numerous exceptions or defenses to prosecution that the officer on the street
cannot possibly adjudicate. The officer simply cannot, constitutionally, func-
tion as both enforcer and judge. He must either send the minor away with-
out a warning that taints a juvenile record, or conduct a custodial arrest.'79
V. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
A. Operative Standards
The substantive due process component of the Fourteenth Amendment,
which guarantees certain substantive rights against governmental infringe-
ment, encompasses most of the enumerated liberties of the Bill of Rights
and a small list of unenumerated freedoms."' Governmental enactments
that infringe on these liberties can be constitutional if and only if they sur-
vive the test of strict scrutiny.'' Succinctly stated, to pass constitutional
muster, the governmental objective must be "compelling" '82 and the regu-
lation must be drawn with precision,'83 be narrowly tailored to satisfy the
compelling objective, 4 and constitute the least restrictive means of ac-
complishing the legislative purpose."'
Conversely, federalism requires extensive room for state and local gov-
ernment power and experimentation. Consequently, an enactment within the
"police power"1 16 of a state or local instrumentality that does not infringe a
177 Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 429 (1969).
178 Cf Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 11 (1980) (finding that segregation of prisoner
without prior hearing may violate due process if the postponement of procedural
protections is not justified by apprehended emergency conditions).
179 The city council amended the original Dallas ordinance following briefing and
hearing on the merits to delete the warning mechanism. See Amended Dallas Ordinance,
supra note 18, § 31-33(d).
180 See infra note 218.
181 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
182 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155-56 (1973); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16 (1973).
183 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 483 (1963).
184 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969).
185 Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960). Potential First Amendment viola-
tions implicate additional and even more stringent standards of review. See generally
infra part V.A.
186 In exercising its "police power," state and local governments act to further the
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fundamental right or discriminate against a suspect class need satisfy only a
rational basis standard of review, which requires that the means be rationally
related to the objective. 87
Most regulations, including curfew regulations, can withstand the defer-
ential analysis of the rational basis test. Consequently, challengers must first
prove that a curfew law implicates and burdens a fundamental right, where-
upon the burden shifts to the locality to show that the ordinance can with-
stand strict constitutional scrutiny.
B. Potential Infringements on Minors' Rights
1. Criminalizing Innocuous Activity
From a substantive due process perspective, the rudimentary fatal defect
in the curfew is that it makes innocence a crime.'88 It penalizes conduct
that does not infringe upon either the rights or interests of juveniles or
adults,'89 summarily branding all children as lawbreakers or potential law-
breakers and all parents as incapable of exercising appropriate supervi-
sion. 9' It restricts both innocuous and beneficial activity, correlating con-
duct calculated to harm with conduct entirely innocent.'' It criminalizes
activities that, substantively, cannot be criminalized or otherwise prohibited.
public health, safety, morals, and general welfare. See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,
416 U.S. 1, 4 (1974); Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 391
(1926).
' See, e.g., Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984); Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co.,
455 U.S. 422 (1982); Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221 (1981); United States R.R.
Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980); City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S.
297 (1976).
188 This, of course, begs the essential question. If the legislature declares that certain
conduct is a "crime," the behavior is no longer innocent. Surely, however, the Constitu-
tion must impose some substantive limitation on the authority of a legislature to
criminalize conduct. Traditionally, this might have stemmed from the Due Process
Clause, but purported crime will always provide a sufficient justification for an enact-
ment purportedly interdicting crime. Nevertheless, the Constitution should create a zone
of innocence into which the legislature cannot intrude.
89 See, e.g., McCollester v. City of Keene, 514 F. Supp. 1046, 1052 (D.N.H. 1981)
(holding that curfew penalizes conduct blameless under law and possibly totally inno-
cent in nature), rev'd on other grounds, 668 F.2d 617 (1st Cir. 1982); Hayes v. Munici-
pal Court, 487 P.2d 974, 978 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971) (holding loitering ordinance
unconstitutional).
" See, e.g., City of Panora v. Simmons, 445 N.W.2d 363, 373 (Iowa 1989)
(Lavorato, J., dissenting).
19 See, e.g., In re Doe, 513 P.2d 1385, 1387 (Haw. 1983) (declaring a "loitering"
juvenile curfew overbroad because of failure to distinguish wrongful and innocent con-
duct); City of Seattle v. Pullman, 514 P.2d 1059, 1061 (Wash. 1973) (en banc).
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Violating a curfew ordinance is, in essence, an artificial crime, created by
legislative bodies to appear responsive to significant social problems.
Without expressly recognizing the due process implications, a Texas
court held in 1898 that the government could not penalize innocuous, or
even salutary, conduct:
[The question is whether], conceding that the municipality
has authority under its general powers to pass any ordinance
that is reasonable to preserve the public peace and to protect
the good order and morals of the community, the ordinance
in question is reasonable. We hold that it is not; that it is
paternalistic, and is an invasion of the personal liberty of the
citizen. It may be that there are some bad boys in our cities
and towns ... who prowl about the streets and alleys during
the nighttime and commit offenses. Of course, whenever they
do, they are amenable to the law. But [it does not] therefore
follow that it is a legitimate function of government to re-
strain them and keep them off the streets when they are com-
mitting no offense .... 192
Vesting in governmental instrumentalities the authority to deprive per-
sons of freedom to engage in innocent conduct is a frightening proposition.
The Due Process Clause should proscribe such a result. Once innocence can
be the subject of arrest and criminal prosecution, the concept of due process
evaporates. "3 Arguably, therefore, the substantive component of the Due
Process Clause makes even the most carefully drafted blanket law unconsti-
tutional.
2. Freedom of Association
The second natural constitutional challenge lies in freedom of associa-
tion. Logically, any law that restricts public movement for an extended
period of time, including restricting travel to and from social activities,
restricts association. Yet the constitutional liberty of association is not coex-
"' Ex parte McCarver, 46 S.W. 936, 937 (Tex. Crim. App. 1898).
193 A Florida appellate court, declaring unconstitutional a juvenile curfew ordinance,
seemed to recognize this proposition, even under a diminished standard of review:
The ordinance would make many activities unlawful which otherwise would be
lawful. The general right of every person to engage in lawful activity, while sub-
ject to reasonable restriction, cannot be completely taken away under the guise of
police regulation. An ordinance to the contrary is an arbitrary invasion of the
inherent personal liberties of all citizens.
W.J.W. v. State, 356 So. 2d 48, 50 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
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tensive with its literal or colloquial use, complicating the constitutional anal-
ysis.
Although the Supreme Court never has definitively stated the derivation
of the right to free association, the liberty is firmly entrenched in constitu-
tional jurisprudence.' Supreme Court precedent affords constitutional pro-
tection to freedom of association in two distinct ways:
First, the Court has held that the Constitution protects against
unjustified government interference with an individual's
choice to enter into and maintain certain intimate or private
relationships. Second, the Court has upheld the freedom of
individuals to associate for the purpose of engaging in pro-
tected speech or religious activities.'95
The first protection, "intrinsic" freedom of association, is described as a
fundamental element of personal liberty. This freedom of intimate associ-
ation consists of individual choices "to enter into and maintain certain inti-
mate human relationships.' ' 196 "Instrumental" or "expressive" freedom of
association consists of the right to associate for the purpose of engaging in
activities specifically protected by the First Amendment.'97
In delineating the scope of the constitutional freedom of intimate associ-
ation, the Court has sketched a continuum, with family associations at one
end, and business associations at the other. The former "involve deep attach-
ments and commitments to the necessarily few other individuals with whom
one shares not only a special community of thoughts, experiences, and be-
liefs but also distinctively personal aspects of one's life."'98 These commit-
ments are characterized by "relative smallness, a high degree of selectivity
in decisions to begin and maintain the affiliation, and seclusion from others
in critical aspects of the relationship.'
199
The opposite end of the continuum is defined by the converse of these
characteristics. Phrased in the negative, business associations are those that
lack the qualities of familial and other intimate personal associations and are
19 Sometimes annexed to the right to travel, see, e.g., Aptheker v. Secretary of State,
378 U.S. 500, 517 (1964), or substantive due process liberty, see Roberts v. United
States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 500, 517 (1964), freedom of association easily flows from the
First Amendment. It is incidental to the exercise of express First Amendment freedoms,
if not nonconsequentially inherent in the Amendment itself.
Board of Directors v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537, 544 (1987).
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 617.
197 Id. at 618.
198 Id. at 619-20.
199 Id. at 620.
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imbued with qualities that seem "remote from the concerns giving rise to
this constitutional protection. ' (
Between these poles extends a continuum of human relationships "that
may make greater or lesser claims to constitutional protection from particu-
lar incursions by the State."2"1 The Court has not identified intermediate
points, but has concluded that the issue of authority to regulate a particular
association "entails a careful assessment of where that relationship's objec-
tive characteristics locate it on a spectrum from the most intimate to the




Juveniles within the purview of a curfew ordinance may pursue general
social association, but they also may pursue more intimate associations to
which public movement may be essential. The Court's decision in Stanglin,
addressing the issue of "chance encounters" with "hundreds of teenag-
ers,"23 is not dispositive. As one court noted, a curfew regulation
operates in a much more blunderbuss fashion: While it pro-
scribes 'chance encounters' in dance halls and other forms of
random association, it would also effectively prohibit on its
face forms of nocturnal ... association that would clearly
fall within the ambit of the First Amendment.2°
Further, the freedom to enter into an intimate association may be inte-
gral to intimate association. The psychology is compelling: "When a person
walks out into public he removes the barriers that inhibit ready association
and communication by him and his fellow citizens. Only when he is in
public may he enjoy the most meaningful exercise of his freedom of...
association."2 5 Certainly, the restriction is extreme. A total nocturnal ban
on all innocent and normal activity necessarily deprives some minors of the
freedom to form and cultivate intimate associations.
Curfews also can infringe expressive association. The Court has de-
scribed expressive association as tangential to express First Amendment
freedoms: the protection of collective effort on behalf of shared goals is
"especially important in preserving political and cultural diversity and in
shielding dissident expression from suppression by the majority. ' 2116 Conse-




2"3 Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 24 (1989).
204 Waters v. Barry, 711 F. Supp. 1125, 1134 n.16 (D.D.C. 1989).
205 People v. Chambers, 335 N.E.2d 612, 617 (I1. App. Ct. 1975), rev'd, 360 N.E.2d
55 (111. 976).
206 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622.
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Amendment [is] a corresponding right to associate with others in pursuit of
a wide variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and
cultural ends."2 7 This right, ancillary but intrinsic to the exercise of other
First Amendment freedoms, is violated at least to the same extent as are the
express First Amendment liberties. Thus, the expressive association analysis,
in this context, parallels the analysis of free speech issues.
3. Freedom of Speech
a. Conceptual Flaw
The curfew regulation, even with an exception for First Amendment
activity, suffers from a fatal conceptual flaw. It either is unenforceable or it
appears to operate as an intolerable restraint on free speech liberties.
The Dallas ordinance, for example, provides the following enforcement
mechanism:
Before taking any enforcement action under this section, a
police officer shall ask the apparent offender's age and rea-
son for being in the public place. The officer shall not issue
a citation or make an arrest under this section unless the
officer reasonably believes that an offense has occurred and
that, based on any response and other circumstances, no
defense ... is present.2"8
An enforcement official confronted in a public place during curfew hours
with a youth asserting a free speech exception will either believe the youth
and allow her to continue, or disbelieve her and take enforcement action. If
the officer believes every assertion of First Amendment activity, the excep-
tion will swallow the proscription. If the officer takes enforcement action
against a free speech claim, he will in some notable number of cases err,
placing a constitutionally intolerable restraint on the exercise of a First
Amendment freedom. Because the curfew ordinance is thus "susceptible of
regular application to protected expression,"2 ' it may be constitutionally
infirm.
Additionally, the enforcement procedure necessarily may delegate un-
constitutionally to the officer on the street impermissible discretion to as-
certain the existence of, and to curtail, free speech liberties. Any law involv-
ing speech that places too much discretion in the hands of its enforcement
207 Id.
208 Amended Dallas Ordinance, supra note 18, § 31-33(d).
20" City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 467 (1987).
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officials violates the First Amendment.210 The curfew enactment by its
very nature must delegate such extensive discretion.
Superficially, these arguments appear persuasive. Nevertheless, the un-
derlying principle, taken to its logical extreme, would prohibit proscribing
any conduct by which the actor intended to exercise speech interests. The
First Amendment, as construed, does not extend this far.
b. Analytical Flaw
The analytical flaw, though potentially fatal, may be subject to a similar
fate. As most courts recognize, the restriction is not content-based but, rath-
er, content-neutral, only incidentally restricting free speech freedoms. Thus,
the less restrictive O'Brien2 1 ' analytical framework" 2 determines its con-
stitutionality under the First Amendment.213 Because the test is relatively
lenient, the blanket curfew law probably can survive the challenge.
A contrary argument is, however, theoretically sound. Arguably, only in
an emergency is a curfew "no greater than is essential" '214 to further the
governmental interest. Only the necessity of extreme action to protect public
health and safety from immediate and grave danger that characterizes the
emergency laws' blanket restrictions of free speech liberties can justify the
curfew.215 The "wholesale 2 6 restriction of the curfew broadly stifles the
free speech liberties of thousands of innocent youth. Because the massive
effect far exceeds any compelling necessity, the restriction cannot be justi-
fied as an incidental restriction or a time, place, or manner regulation. Tem-
porally, it depletes six or seven hours from a sixteen-hour waking day. Spa-
tially, it is all-inclusive of the public stage. In scope, it regulates all noctur-
21 See Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 129-30 (1992) (hold-
ing unconstitutional under Free Speech Clause a county ordinance permitting govern-
ment administrator to vary parade permit fees without providing standards to guide
discretion); Hill, 482 U.S. at 465 (declaring unconstitutional under Free Speech Clause
a municipal ordinance making unlawful the interruption of a police officer exercising
duties).
211 United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
212 O'Brien requires a reviewing court to uphold a regulation if it furthers an impor-
tant or substantial governmental interest, if the governmental interest is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression, and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amend-
ment freedoms is no greater than essential to the furtherance of that interest. Id. at 377.
213 See, e.g., United States v. Chalk, 441 F.2d 1277, 1280 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 943 (1971); Waters v. Barry, 711 F. Supp. 1125, 1136 (D.D.C. 1989); Bykofsky v.
Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242, 1257 (M.D. Pa. 975), aft'd, 535 F.2d
1245 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 964 (1976).
214 O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
215 See Moorhead v. Farrelly, 723 F. Supp. 1109, 1112-13 (D.V.l. 1989) (holding
constitutional under O'Brien a curfew imposed following a hurricane).
216 Waters, 711 F. Supp. at 1136.
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nal activity by proscribing all nocturnal activity. Its breadth seems to far
exceed any necessity.
The Court, however, has expansively construed O'Brien and rarely
found that an enactment did not satisfy O'Brien's constraints.217 Conse-
quently, a free speech challenge, though theoretically sound, may not be
practicably viable.
4. Freedom of Movement
Freedom of movement is not an enumerated liberty,2"8 but this alone
does not denigrate its constitutional stature. Like express freedoms, unstated
fundamental rights cannot be infringed without demonstrating that the regu-
lation is essential to further a compelling governmental interest, narrowly
tailored, and uses the least restrictive means available to secure the objec-
tive.
If "[t]he right to walk the streets, or to meet publicly with one's friends
for a noble purpose or for no purpose at all-and to do so whenever one
pleases-is an integral component of life in a free and ordered society,"2 9
blanket juvenile curfews are unconstitutional unless the governmental entity
can satisfy the exacting requirements of strict scrutiny. Unquestionably, the
blanket curfew egregiously infringes freedom of movement. The liberty,
however, is both amorphous and ambiguous.
Although the Supreme Court early and repeatedly recognized the critical
status of movement, it never has declared expressly the right to be funda-
mental.2" In 1972, the Court, while holding a vagrancy ordinance uncon-
stitutionally vague, indicated that intra-state and intra-city movement may be
217 See, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991) (upholding public
indecency statute as applied to nude dancers).
21 Unenumerated fundamental freedoms are those "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty," Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), or "so rooted in the traditions
and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental," Snyder v. Massachusetts,
291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934). The Supreme Court gingerly has declared certain
unenumerated freedoms to be fundamental, including travel, marriage, and privacy in
intimate family matter. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 338 (1972) (free-
dom to travel); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (prohibition of interracial
marriage infringed fundamental right to marry); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431
U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (noting that "freedom of personal choice in matters of ... family
life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment"). See generally Note, The Juvenile Curfew Ordinance: In Search of a New
Standard of Review, 41 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 163, 181-82 n.88 (1992).
219 Waters, 711 F. Supp. at 1134.
2 In numerous opinions, the Court has solidified the fundamental nature of freedom
of interstate travel. See infra note 226. Presumably, the activity implicated in curfew
ordinances more frequently involves intra-state and intra-city movement.
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fundamental. To this end, the Court provided a cogent and persuasive ratio-
nale grounded in psychology and history:
[Night walking, loafing, and strolling] are historically part of
the amenities of life as we have known them. They are not
mentioned in the Constitution or in the Bill of Rights. These
unwritten amenities have been in part responsible for giving
our people the feeling of independence and self-confidence,
the feeling of creativity. These amenities have dignified the
right of dissent and have honored the right to be noncon-
formists and the right to defy submissiveness. They have
encouraged lives of high spirits rather than hushed, suffocat-
ing silence.22
In an earlier opinion, the Court discussed the right in less eloquent but more
decisive terms:
In all the States, from the beginning down to the adoption of
the Articles of Confederation, the citizens thereof possessed
the fundamental right, inherent in citizens of all free govern-
ments, peacefully to dwell within the limits of their respec-
tive states, to move at will from place to place therein, and
to have free ingress thereto and egress therefrom, with a
consequent authority in the States to forbid and punish viola-
tions of this fundamental right.222
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, dissenting from a denial of
certiorari in a juvenile curfew case, stated that the "freedom to leave one's
house and move about at will is 'of the very essence of a scheme of ordered
liberty."' 223 The current Court, however, has never definitively so held.
In Waters, the District Court for the District of Columbia extrapolated
from these and other decisions to find a fundamental right to movement
rooted in the First Amendment and in the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments.224 The court wrote that the right to walk the
221 Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 164 (1972).
22 United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281, 293 (1920).
223 Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 429 U.S. 964 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)). Marshall cited several
cases in support of his proposition, including Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 156 (1972);
Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971), and Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496
(1939).
22 Waters v. Barry, 711 F. Supp. 1109, 1134 (D.D.C. 1989); see also City of Panora
v. Simmons, 445 N.W.2d 363 (Iowa 1989) (rejecting a challenge to the constitutionality
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streets at pleasure is critical "to partake of activities that expand the mind
and the soul but also because the right to move about-if even for no rea-
son-is a cherished end in itself."'22
Virtually all courts striking curfew laws, and some courts upholding
them, have held that movement is a fundamental liberty.226 The analysis is
of a juvenile curfew, finding that minors did not possess a fundamental due process
freedom of movement). In City of Maquoketa v. Russell, 484 N.W.2d 179, 182 (Iowa
1992), the court declared the right to movement fundamental to the exercise of First
Amendment freedoms and held a curfew ordinance unconstitutional.
' Waters, 711 F. Supp. at 1134. One court addressing the issue described attendance
at plays, musicals, motion pictures, church functions, dances, and obtaining food and
drink as fundamental. See In re Mosier, 394 N.E.2d 368, 372-73 (Ohio C.P. 1978). The
court's analysis is misguided. It is the movement to these activities that is fundamental,
not the activities themselves. A right to participate in an activity does not venerate the
activity. For example, the right to choose an abortion is fundamental; the right to abort
is not. Regulation of the activities the court enumerated would generate only rational
basis review.
226 See, e.g., McCollester v. City of Keene, 586 F. Supp. 1381, 1384 (D.N.H. 1984)
(finding that "the ordinance implicates a personal liberty interest of the juvenile plaintiff
in the freedom of movement"); McCollester v. City of Keene, 514 F. Supp. 1046
(D.N.H. 1981) (finding that the rights to locomotion, to freedom of movement, to go
where one pleases, and to use the public streets and facilities in a way that does not
interfere with the personal liberty of others are invaluable and central to American citi-
zenship), rev'd on other grounds, 668 F.2d 617 (1st Cir. 1982); Bykofsky v. Borough
of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242, 1254 (M.D. Pa. 1975) (noting that "[r]ights of loco-
motion, freedom of movement, to go where one pleases, and to use the public streets in
a way that does not interfere with the personal liberty of others are basic values 'im-
plicit in the concept of ordered liberty' protected by the [D]ue [P]rocess [C]lause of the
Fourteenth Amendment .... One may be on the streets even though he is there mere-
ly for exercise, recreation, walking, standing, talking, socializing, or any other purpose
that does not interfere with other persons' rights."), affd, 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 964 (1976); Davis v. Justice Court, 89 Cal. Rptr. 409, 414 (Ct. App.
1970) (noting that "a curfew, restricting as it does the right of free movement, does
interfere with what ordinarily is a right of the citizenry. Obviously, the right to free
movement cannot be interfered with unless extraordinary and perilous conditions exist,
such as a riot, and perhaps only one of formidable dimension."); In re J.M., 768 P.2d
219, 221 (Colo. 1989) (en banc) (noting that "[a]lthough not labeled a 'fundamental
right,' the United States Supreme Court has defined the activities enumerated by [the
plaintiff] as historical 'amenities of life"'); Brown v. Ashton, 611 A.2d 599, 606 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1991) (observing that "[w]hatever its source, [the right to movement] is
now widely regarded as 'fundamental"'), vacated, 660 A.2d 447 (Md. 1992); Allen v.
City of Bordentown, 524 A.2d 478, 483 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1987) (finding the
right to travel, loiter, and "loaf' protected by Due Process Clause); City of Seattle v.
Pullman, 514 P.2d 1059, 1063 (Wash. 1973) (observing that "'[p]rima facie mere saun-
tering or loitering on a public way is lawful and the right of any man, woman, or
child"') (quoting Commonwealth v. Carpenter, 91 N.E.2d 666, 667 (Mass. 1950)); City
of Milwaukee v. K.F., 426 N.W.2d 329, 337 (Wis. 1988) (stating that the "right to be
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elementally correct. First, Supreme Court precedent indicates that movement
is fundamental.227 Second, as the context of a curfew clarifies, movement
is "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty"2" and "so rooted in the tra-
ditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked fundamental." '229
Freedom and constitutional government necessarily must encompass the
"[a]imless idle stops, pauses and purposeless distraction, 230 that are inex-
tricable to liberty.
Movement is, in every sense, both the essence of freedom and the sub-
stance of personhood. Freedom of movement and freedom to choose to
move must be deemed fundamental, because movement and choice in move-
ment are instrumental to the exercise of express liberties and are of inesti-
mable intrinsic value. They are the substance of enshrined constitutional
freedoms and liberties essential to freedom, and to definition of self.
To vest in governmental authorities the right to define as criminal mere
movement about the streets is to divest society of liberty and of the sub-
stance of constitutional government. Liberty means that "[o]ne may be on
the streets even though he is there merely for exercise, recreation, walking,
standing, talking, socializing, or any other purpose that does not interfere
with other persons' rights.""23 It means freedom to choose to stroll, dance,
play, attend and participate in civic and charitable activities, attend sports
events, and engage in other benign endeavors. It means freedom to be hu-
man.
In a different context, the Supreme Court recently affirmed the concept
of substantive due process liberty and expansively defined its parameters in
a manner that would seem to include liberty of movement:
free to move about within one's own state is inherent and distinct from the right to
interstate travel"). In Johnson v. City of Opelousas, the Fifth Circuit annexed movement
to the right to travel: "[T]he right of 'all citizens' to be free to travel within and be-
tween the states uninhibited by statutes or regulations which unreasonably burden this
movement, certainly extends in some measure to juveniles, as citizens of the United
States." Johnson v. City of Opelousas, 658 F.2d 1065, 1072 (5th Cir. 1981) (citations
omitted). In Qutb, the court assumed for purposes of equal protection analysis that
movement was a fundamental right. Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488, 492 (5th Cir. 1993),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2134 (1994). The court then noted that the ordinance was di-
rected solely at the activities of juveniles and proceeded to negate any fundamental right
of juveniles to move freely. Id.; see also City of Panora, 445 N.W.2d at 367 (finding
firmly rooted in constitutional jurisprudence the notion that a person's right to merely
wander and stroll about town is fundamental, but distinguishing the rights of minors).
2 See supra notes 219, 222-23 and accompanying text.
22 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
229 Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
230 In re Frank 0., 247 Cal. Rptr. 655, 657 (Ct. App. 1988).
Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242, 1257 (M.D. Pa. 1975),
aff'd, 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 964 (1976).
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It is a promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of
personal liberty which the government may not enter....
.. . At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's
own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and
of the mystery of human life. 3 '
Liberty to move is necessarily a facet of this constitutional promise and of
the capacity of self-definition that the Constitution embodies. A society that
does not perceive freedom of movement and choice in movement as funda-
mental components of liberty cannot call itself free.
Freedom of movement thus satisfies all the requisites of a "fundamental"
right. It is not, however, absolute. It can be regulated upon demonstration
that the restriction is necessary to further a compelling governmental inter-
est. 233 Furthermore, governmental authorities traditionally possess greater
authority to regulate the activities of minors, which may dilute the constitu-
tional freedom as applied to juveniles.
C. Analytical Review
1. The Rights of Minors: Augmented Governmental Authority
Minors undoubtedly possess constitutional rights, but they are not coex-
tensive with those of adults." In 1944, the Court upheld the constitution-
ality of a statute that restricted a minor's use of the streets for selling reli-
gious magazines."' The Court acknowledged that the regulation would be
unconstitutional as applied to adults but distinguished the role and rights of
juveniles:
The state's authority over children's activities is broader than
over like actions of adults. This is peculiarly true of public
activities and in matters of employment.
It is true children have rights, in common with older
people, in the primary use of highways. But even in such use
streets afford dangers for them not affecting adults . ...
What may be wholly permissible for adults therefore may
232 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847, 851 (1992).
z See supra notes 218-19 and accompanying text.
14 City of Panora v. Simmons, 445 N.W.2d 363, 367 (Iowa 1989).
" Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
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not be so for children, either with or without their parents'
presence.
We think that with reference to the public proclaiming of
religion, upon the streets and in other similar public places,
the power of the state to control the conduct of children
reaches beyond the scope of its authority over adults, as is
true in the case of other freedoms, and the rightful boundary
of its power has not been crossed in this case.236
Three decades later, the Court described both the rights of and restrictions
on minors:
The question of the extent of state power to regulate conduct
of minors not constitutionally regulable when committed by
adults is a vexing one, perhaps not susceptible of precise
answer. We have been reluctant to attempt to define the
totality of the relationship of the juvenile and the state. Cer-
tain principles, however, have been recognized. Minors, as
well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess
constitutional rights. Whatever may be their precise impact,
neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is
for adults alone. On the other hand, we have held in a vari-
ety of contexts that the power of the state to control the con-
duct of children reaches beyond the scope of its authority
over adults.237
Recently, the Court reaffirmed the constitutional status of the rights of
minors: "Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically
only when one attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as
adults,. are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional
rights.""23 Similarly, the Court solidified the First Amendment rights of
minors, declaring unconstitutional under the Free Speech Clause a regulation
prohibiting students from wearing black arm bands to publicize objections to
Vietnam hostilities.239 Minors possess rights to freedom of religion,24 °
236 Id. at 168-70.
237 Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 692 (1977) (citations omitted).
" Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) (establishing minors'
right of privacy in choosing abortion without parental veto).
239 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
240 Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990) (holding that a student Christian
club was entitled to recognition in public high schools if other noncurricular clubs are
recognized).
988 [Vol. 4:3
JUVENILE CURFEW: UNCONSTITUTIONAL IMPRISONMENT
and constitutional rights in the criminal context are solidly ensconced, in-
cluding protection against double jeopardy,241 the right to be convicted on-
ly by proof beyond a reasonable doubt,242 and rights to court-appointed
counsel, notice, confrontation of witnesses, and cross-examination. 3
Thus, "[a] child, merely on account of his minority, is not beyond the
protection of the Constitution., 244 The Supreme Court has recognized,
however, that although minors possess a full panoply of constitutional
rights,245 governmental entities maintain augmented authority over the con-
duct of minors.24' Thus, a restriction unconstitutional as applied to adults
can be constitutional as applied to minors if it furthers a "significant state
interest ... that is not present in the case of an adult." 7 Specifically, a
plurality of the Supreme Court held in Bellotti v. Baird248 that a regulation
which is unconstitutional when applied to adults survives constitutional
scrutiny as applied to minors if and only if the following three factors avail:
"the peculiar vulnerability. of children; their inability to make critical deci-
sions in an informed, mature manner; and the importance of the parental
role in child rearing." 249
24! See Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 527-29 (1975).
242 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970) (requiring proof beyond a reason-
able doubt in delinquency proceedings involving charges of acts that would be criminal
offenses if committed by adults).
243 See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 29-31 (1967).
244 Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 633 (1979).
245 See, e.g., H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 408 (1981) (reaffirming minor's right
to choose abortion without veto power of third party but stressing that "[tihere is no
logical relationship between the capacity to become pregnant and the capacity for ma-
ture judgment concerning the wisdom of an abortion"); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,
428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) ("Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being magi-
cally only when one attains the state-defined age of majority.").
246 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 899 (1992) (upholding con-
stitutionality of provision requiring parental notification of decision to abort if adequate
judicial bypass procedure is available); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S.
260 (1988) (upholding censorship of school-sponsored student newspaper); Bethel Sch.
Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986) (sustaining discipline of student for using
lewd language in nominating speech at student assembly); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,
403 U.S. 528 (1971) (holding that trial by jury not constitutionally required in adjudi-
cative phase of juvenile delinquency proceedings); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629
(1968) (upholding constitutionality of statute prohibiting sale to minors of nonobscene
sexually explicit material).
247 Danforth, 428 U.S. at 75.
214 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
24 Id. at 634. Although only three members of the Court joined Justice Powell's
opinion, none of the other Justices disputed the accuracy or relevance of the three crite-
ria. Bellotti represents the only expansive opinion articulating possible bases for distin-
guishing the rights of minors.
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The Bellotti analysis is applied inconsistently in the curfew context.
Several courts invert the constitutional inquiry by employing the tripartite
Bellotti test to prove that minors do not possess fundamental rights 50 In
Qutb, the Fifth Circuit erroneously characterized Bellotti as defining the
three reasons that permit differential treatment of the rights of minors and
adults and stated that the analysis "affects the balancing between of [sic] the
state's interest against the interests of the minor when determining whether
the state's interest is compelling."'"
The function of the Bellotti framework is not to define the amplitude of
the liberties of minors or the amplitude of the governmental interest but to
assess the elative impact of the governmental interest in regulating liberties
that the Constitution identifies as fundamental to minors and adults. Thus,
the juvenile status of the holder does not affect the nature or value of the
liberty but only augments the regulatory authority.
Most of the courts properly analyzing the Bellotti factors conclude that
no interest justifies imposition of a blanket curfew. As one court summa-
rized, the Bellotti factors are not germane to issues implicating the innocent
activity of juveniles. 2
250 See, e.g., Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242, 1253-58
(M.D. Pa. 1975) (pre-Bellotti opinion concluding that different and additional govern-
mental interests in regulating the conduct of minors signifies that freedom of movement,
although fundamental to adults, is not fundamental to minors), affd, 535 F.2d 1245 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 964 (1976); In re J.M., 768 P.2d 219, 221-23 (Colo. 1989)
(en banc) (relying on Bellotti to reach same conclusion); City of Panora v. Simmons,
445 N.W.2d 363, 368-69 (Iowa 1989) (applying Bellotti framework to determine that
movement was not fundamental as to minors and, thus, only a rational relationship be-
tween means and ends need exist). The dissent in City of Panora challenged the
Bykofsky analysis:
The reasoning in Bykofsky was backward. The court held that because the
interests served by the curfew ordinance outweighed any infringement of the
rights of minors, the ordinance affected no fundamental rights.
The court in Bykofsky should have applied a two-step analysis. First, it should
have determined the right level of scrutiny by deciding whether a fundamental
right was at stake; then, it should have considered whether the government's
interest outweighed that right. The court simply relied on the fact that it was
dealing with children to justify its use of a rational basis analysis. Because a
fundamental right was clearly involved, the court should have used a strict scruti-
ny analysis as suggested in Bellotti. Perhaps the result would have been differ-
ent ....
Id. at 374 (Lavorato, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). The court in Brown v. Ashton
likewise noted the inverted nature of the analysis. Brown v. Ashton, 611 A.2d 599, 607
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991), vacated, 660 A.2d 447 (Md. 1992).
"' Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488, 492 n.6 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
2134 (1994).
252 McCollester v. City of Keene, 586 F. Supp. 1381, 1386 (D.N.H. 1984).
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Crime may pose a peculiar danger to children who are immature and
unsophisticated in the ways of the street. 253 Violence is, however, ubiqui-
tous and nonselective, affecting and traumatizing all. 4 Thus, although the
minor's enhanced vulnerability to crime and its turmoil may justify a sepa-
rate criminal justice system2" or unique control of obscene material,2" it
does not justify blanket restrictions of innocuous activity. Any minimal
additional vulnerability of minors does not justify the maximum infringe-
ment.
25 7
Additionally, the decision to remain in public during nocturnal hours
does not implicate an "important, affirmative choice[] with potentially seri-
ous consequences."258 The decision at issue is not whether to engage in
criminal activity but whether to remain in public at night, a determination
bereft of the potentially serious consequences that infuse the choice to
abort,259 to purchase sexually explicit materials, or to possess and view
child pornography.260 Only the exceptional case that would have profound
consequences warrants such an expansive infringement of fundamental liber-
ties.
Finally, a blanket curfew does not further, but rather frustrates, the pa-
rental role. It "gracelessly arrogates unto itself and to the police the precious
rights of parenthood."' In Bellotti, the Court found that "[l]egal restric-
tions on minors, especially those supportive of the parental role, may be
important to the child's chances for the full growth and maturity that make
eventual participation in a free society meaningful and rewarding."262 Lim-
itations that thwart the parental role may have the converse effect. As one
court noted: "Instilling the principles of morality, ethical conduct, religion,
See, e.g., Brown, 611 A.2d at 608.
, See Waters v. Barry, 711 F. Supp. 1109, 1137 (D.D.C. 1989).
255 Johnson v. City of Opelousas, 658 F.2d 1065, 1073 (5th Cir. 1981); Brown, 611
A.2d at 608.
256 See United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 464 (1994); Ginsberg v.
New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
" In McCollester, the court held the ordinance unconstitutional but found that mi-
nors were peculiarly vulnerable, noting that the ordinance indicated a legislative concern
over the safety and general welfare of vulnerable, impressionable minors. McCollester
v. City of Keene, 514 F. Supp. 1046, 1050 (D.N.H. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 668
F.2d 617 (1st Cir. 1982).
2 Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979).
z See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992).
26 X-Citement Video, 115 S. Ct. at 464; Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 629; see also Osborne
v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990) (upholding prohibition against possession and viewing of
child pornography against First Amendment challenge); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S.
747 (1982) (holding that child pornography was not entitled to First Amendment protec-
tion).
26 Waters v. Barry, 711 F. Supp. 1109, 1137 (D.D.C. 1989).
262 Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 638-39 (1979).
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and citizenship is primarily the function and responsibility of the minors'
parents and, in large part, is beyond the competence of impersonal political
institutions," particularly an amorphous, distant government.263
Further, even assuming some familial deterioration, any benefit that a
curfew law may confer on needy children and families comes at the substan-
tial expense of intruding into healthy family units and healthy parenting.2"
Conscripting the many to reach the few is inconsistent with a democratic
system of constitutional government.
Because a blanket juvenile curfew does not implicate any of the Bellotti
criteria,"' any expansive governmental interest in regulating the conduct
of juveniles cannot rectify the constitutional infirmities of the regulation.
Juvenile curfew regulations simply cannot survive a substantive due process
challenge unless analogous adult restrictions are constitutionally permissi-
ble.266 In addition, even assuming that immaturity and vulnerability justify
differential treatment, the juvenile curfew is constitutional if and only if it
satisfies the nexus inquiry.
2. Nexus: Narrowly Tailored and Least Restrictive Means
The governmental interest in reducing criminal activity and victimization
is compelling, but this does not end the constitutional inquiry. The "nexus"
requirement mandates that the means selected be narrowly tailored to the
objective and the least restrictive means of achieving that objective.267 The
263 McCollester v. City of Keene, 514 F. Supp. 1046, 1051 (D.N.H. 1981), rev'd on
other grounds, 668 F.2d 617 (1st Cir. 1982).
26 See Qutb v. City of Dallas, No. CA 3-91-CV-1310-R, slip op. at 28 (N.D. Tex.
Aug. 10, 1992), rev'd sub nom. Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488 (5th Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 2134 (1994).
265 But see, e.g., Village of Deerfield v. Greenberg, 550 N.E.2d 12, 16 (I11. App. Ct.
1990) (quoting People v. Chambers, 360 N.E.2d 55, 57-58 (I11. 976)). In Chambers,
the court found all of the Bellotti factors applicable:
The statute proceeds upon the basic assumption that when a child is at home dur-
ing the late night and early morning hours, it is protected from physical as well as
moral dangers. Although there are instances, unfortunately, in which this assump-
tion is untrue, we are satisfied that the State is justified in acting upon it.
By providing a sanction against the parent who knowingly permits a child to
violate the statue, the cooperation of the parent is commanded. That sanction may
also operate indirectly to enlist cooperation from the child, who may be willing to
risk getting into trouble himself, but unwilling to involve his parents in a violation
of the law. Parental control is thereby strengthened.
Chambers, 360 N.E.2d at 57-58.
266 For this reason, equal protection analysis recently has become the nucleus of con-
stitutional challenges. See infra part V.E and accompanying text.
267 See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-17 (1982); Shelton v. Tucker, 364
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government cannot pursue legitimate and substantial ends "by means that
broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more
narrowly achieved. 2
61
The curfew effects a "serious invasion of personal rights and liber-
ties,"2 9 and its sweep is immense:
[It] casts [constitutional] rights aside like so much straw. The
Act subjects ... juveniles to virtual house arrest each night
without differentiating either among those juveniles likely to
embroil themselves in mischief, or among those activities
most likely to produce harm. The Act is a bull in a china
shop of constitutional values.27°
A curfew regulation cannot be narrowly tailored when it restricts the liber-
ties of all to assail the illegal activities of a few.27' It may be convenient
and buttressed by hope, but convenience and hope are not the touchstones of
constitutionality, particularly when the power of arrest for illegal activity
remains both available and viable.272
Stripped of its vestments, the curfew enactment defies logic. If the ob-
jective of a curfew law is to reduce juvenile crime and victimization, by
definition it is not aimed at those who already abide by the law. The under-
lying assumption of a curfew provision must be that it will deter juveniles
who currently leave their homes at night to engage in illegal activity. As the
District of Columbia court stated, "The naivete of such an assumption is
striking."
273
A curfew does not aspire to impede innocent activity; this is merely its
effect. Its aspiration is to deter conduct already made illegal by laws with
substantially enhanced penal sanctions. "Logic thus suggests that the only
juveniles for whom the Act will likely have meaning will be those already
U.S. 479, 488 (1960); see also supra notes 183-85 and accompanying text.
26 Shelton, 364 U.S. at 488.
269 See, e.g., S.W. v. State, 431 So. 2d 339, 341 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
270 Waters v. Barry, 711 F. Supp. 1109, 1134 (D.D.C. 1989).
271 See, e.g., City of Panora v. Simmons, 445 N.W.2d 363, 373 (Iowa 1989)
(Lavorato, J., dissenting).
272 Several courts that held curfew laws unconstitutional reasoned that they are either
not narrowly tailored or the least restrictive means of accomplishing the objective. See,
e.g., Johnson v. City of Opelousas, 658 F.2d 1065, 1074 (5th Cir. 1981); Waters, 711 F.
Supp. at 1136 (noting that "the restriction, although perhaps by its nature silent, would
be massive"); In re Doe, 513 P.2d 1385, 1388 (Haw. 1973); Allen v. City of
Bordentown, 524 A.2d 478, 483-84 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1987).
273 Waters, 711 F. Supp. at 1139.
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inclined to obey the law. When fundamental interests are at stake, this inver-
sion of anticipated effects renders the Act constitutionally unacceptable. 274
Exceptions to enforcement, however, necessarily enter the equation. In
Qutb, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that the district court correctly had found
legitimate activities with which the curfew would interfere, but held that the
curfew was narrowly tailored and the least restrictive means of accomplish-
ing its objectives because of the existence of numerous defenses that allow
minors to stay in public during curfew hours.275 Reasoning that neither the
restrictions nor the defenses could be viewed in isolation from each other,
the court concluded that "the defenses are the most important consideration
in determining whether this ordinance is narrowly tailored.,
27
Persuaded that going home a little early or taking along a parent or
guardian comprised constitutionally insignificant burdens, the court found
the ordinance to be constitutional.277 The court failed to discern that a cur-
few restricts minors from exercising fundamental freedoms that cannot be
recovered in defenses to prosecution. It failed to recognize that no curfew
enactment, however replete with exceptions, can broadly interfere with the
legitimate conduct the curfew necessarily curtails without violating the Con-
stitution.278 If a curfew does so, it is not narrowly tailored.
Although exceptions are relevant to the constitutional inquiry, only in
the rare case can constitutional infirmities be circumvented by relying on
274 Id.
275 Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488, 493-95 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
2134 (1994). The court noted the litany of defenses:
[A] juvenile may move about freely in Dallas if accompanied by a parent or a
guardian, or a person at least eighteen years of age who is authorized by a parent
or guardian to have custody of the minor. If the juvenile is traveling interstate,
returning from a school-sponsored function, a civic organization-sponsored func-
tion, or a religious function, or going home after work, the ordinance does not
apply. If the juvenile is on an errand for his or her parent or guardian, the ordi-
nance does not apply. If the juvenile is involved in an emergency, the ordinance
does not apply. If the juvenile is on a sidewalk in front of his or her home or the
home of a neighbor, the ordinance does not apply. Most notably, if the juvenile is
exercising his or her First Amendment rights, the curfew ordinance does not ap-
ply.
Id. at 494.
276 Id. at 493-94; see also City of Eastlake v. Ruggiero, 220 N.E.2d 126, 128 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1966) (noting that exceptions indicate "no curtailment of normal or legitimate
nighttime activities").
277 Qutb, 11 F.3d at 495.
... This, of course, begs the ultimate question of whether a governmental instrumen-
tality can criminalize any conduct, thereby making otherwise "legitimate" (innocuous)
conduct subject to penal sanctions. Such an enactment may not be within the police
power of state governmental authority. Possibly, the Due Process Clause provides pro-
tection from criminalization of innocence. See supra part IV and accompanying text.
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exceptions to regulation. First, a curfew law does not, and cannot, provide a
defense for the exercise of the fundamental constitutional freedoms to asso-
ciate and to move and choose to move about in public places during noctur-
nal hours. These liberties are obliterated in every case by statutory defini-
tion, irrespective of the existence of a purported exception. In fact, the very
intent of a regulation is to proscribe nocturnal movement and association
unless parental accompaniment avails. Parental accompaniment is neither
regularly feasible279 nor insignificantly invasive.
Additionally, many of the terms used to define defenses are necessarily
imprecise and, possibly, unconstitutionally vague." The terms are inher-
ently subjective and susceptible to varying interpretations. This subjectivity
may unconstitutionally vest in the officer the authority to determine, accord-
ing to whim and predilection, the existence of a violation.
Finally, a curfew restriction, even with exceptions, chills the exercise of
constitutional freedoms. The enforcement procedure offers no certainty that
a minor exercising legitimate exceptions or possessing a legitimate defense
will be secure from custodial arrest. 81 Thus, the curfew effectively com-
pels minors to choose between participating in a constitutionally protected
activity with its attendant risk of arrest or relinquishing constitutionally
protected freedoms.82
As one court noted, the stark differentiation between the blanket and the
emergency curfew lies in the relationship between means and ends:
279 The law assumes that, upon enforcement, parental contact can be achieved. This
assumes that parents will be home and that a telephone is available. In the many homes
in which parents work at night or do not possess telephones, the curfew cannot accom-
plish its mission.
'i See supra notes 220-21 and accompanying text.
28 At least one law has a parental permit procedure that excepts from violation mi-
nors possessing parental notes. See, e.g., George Stein & Kirk Jackson, Carson to Keep
a Tight Rein on Youths, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1987, § 9, at 1. The procedure allows
considerably more parental control but does not foreclose law enforcement seizure. The
law also expends valuable police resources confirming the validity of permits.
282 Moreover, the belatedness of relief further underscores the inherent tension be-
tween the curfew regulation and the exercise of fundamental freedoms. The timeliness
of the hearing alone differentiates the curfew from legislation that imposes only a mini-
mal burden on fundamental rights or is narrowly tailored. Cf Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 885-87 (1992) (validating temporal limitations on choosing to
abort as not impairing the fundamental right); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417
(1990) (same). Mere delay can conscript a liberty. In the First Amendment context, it
may compel the silence of the speaker. See Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind of
N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 794 (1988). "The loss of First Amendment freedoms for even
minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury." Elrod v. Burns,
427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976).
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[C]urfews are constitutionally permissible only where there is
some real and immediate threat to the public safety which
cannot be adequately met through less drastic alternatives
and where the curfew itself is tailored in duration and appli-
cation so as to meet the specific crisis without unnecessary
infringement of individual liberties." 3
Justice Marshall succinctly expressed the distinction: "I have little doubt but
that, absent a genuine emergency, a curfew aimed at all citizens could not
survive constitutional scrutiny.""28 Nothing justifies the differential treat-
ment of juveniles in the context of curfews, at least nothing that can with-
stand constitutional scrutiny.
The emergency curfew necessarily is more narrowly tailored in scope.
Quelling disorder or responding to natural disaster without placing restric-
tions on movement and the exercise of established constitutional rights is
onerous if not impossible. Effective options simply may not be available. If
the geographical and temporal limits are reasonable, the emergency law may
very well be the least restrictive option of satisfying a grave objective.
In contrast, less restrictive means are available to reduce juvenile crime
and victimization and enhance parenting skills. Evening programs for youth,
such as sports and dance clubs, provide minors an environment conducive to
positive socialization surrounded by constructive role models."' Communi-
ty policing allows for the formation of relationships instrumental in reducing
283 Ruff v. Marshall, 438 F. Supp. 303, 306 (M.D. Ga. 1977); see also People v.
McKelvy, 100 Cal. Rptr. 661, 665 (Ct. App. 1972) (noting that "because such regula-
tions drastically curb an individual's freedom, only a clear showing of emergent neces-
sity can justify its imposition").
284 Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 429 U.S. 964, 965 (1976) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (citing United States v. Chalk, 441 F.2d 1277 (1971)) (citation omitted).
Marshall desired to hear the case because he thought the extent of juvenile rights was
unsettled. See also Davis v. Justice Court, 89 Cal. Rptr. 409, 414 (Ct. App. 1970) (stat-
ing that "[i]t is true that a curfew, restricting as it does the right of free movement, does
interfere with what ordinarily is a right of the citizenry. Obviously, the right to free
movement cannot be interfered with unless extraordinary and perilous conditions exist,
such as a riot, and perhaps only one of formidable dimension"); Brown v. Ashton, 611
A.2d 599, 606 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991) (observing that "a general curfew, which ...
is not compelled by an emergency, nor imposed for a short duration, nor in a very
discrete geographical area, could not withstand constitutional scrutiny."), vacated, 660
A.2d 447 (Md. 1992).
285 Prior to institution of the curfew, youth clubs that restricted entry to persons under
age 18 or 21 and did not serve alcoholic beverages pervaded the City of Dallas. Off-
duty police officers acted as security guards, talking with and forming relationships with
the youth. The chilling effect resulting from enactment of the curfew, even though
enforcement was stayed, so disrupted the business of the clubs that none survived.
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crime. Seminars and programs for parents can teach skills necessary to en-
hance respect and control.
The cost of these programs is, of course, substantially greater than a
curfew. A curfew allows a governmental entity to do very little while ap-
pearing "tough on crime." It answers the impatience of a community unwill-
ing either to await delayed gratification or to embrace the efficacy of more
complex initiatives that seek the cure in lieu of applying the Band Aid.
D. Parental Privacy
Protection of parental privacy in childrearing and other intimate family
choices is a fundamental component of due process liberty:
[C]onstitutional interpretation has consistently recognized
that the parents' claim to authority in their own household to
direct the rearing of their children is basic in the structure of
our society. "It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and
nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary
function and freedom include preparation for obligations the
state can neither supply nor hinder."28
Parents have an "important 'guiding role' to play in the upbringing of their
children." 7 Thus, as the Court has recognized on numerous occasions, the
freedom of parents to rear their children according to their own system of
beliefs is of constitutional magnitude. 8
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968) (quoting Prince v. Massachu-
setts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)).
2 H.L. v. Matheson, .450 U.S. 398, 410 (1981) (quoting Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S.
622, 633-39 (1979)).
" See, e.g., Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816 (1977) (noting
that proceedings to remove children from foster families are subject to constraints of the
Due Process Clause, and finding that the importance of the familial relationship to indi-
viduals involved and to society stems from the emotional attachment that is derived
from the intimacy of daily association and the role played in promoting a way of life);
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974) (noting that "freedom
of personal choice in matters ... of family life is one of the liberties protected by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment"); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972) (affirming right of Amish parents whose beliefs conflict with compulsory educa-
tion laws to raise children according to their own system of religious beliefs); Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (holding that an act compelling attendance at
public schools deprived parents and children of right to select school, unreasonably in-
terfering with liberty of parent to direct upbringing and education of children); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (holding that a statute which prohibited the teaching of
any language other than English interfered with Fourteenth Amendment liberty to estab-
1996] 997
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
Curfew enactments, by erecting blanket prohibitions that preclude mi-
nors from exercising fundamental freedoms, substantially inhibit the liberty
of parents to choose to permit their children to exercise these rights. 9 The
curfew law usurps parental discretion in supervising a child's activities29
and making decisions that affect innocuous conduct of the child and the
timing of that conduct. Critically, the curfew expropriates parental discretion
to allow nocturnal activities on the basis of the graduating maturity of the
particular child and interferes with the relationship of trust between the child
and the parent that ideally expands in direct proportion to age.29
Concededly, "[w]hen actions concerning the child have a relation to the
public welfare or the well-being of the child, the state may act to promote
these legitimate interests."'2 92 In its role as parens patriae, the state may re-
strict parental rights by requiring school attendance,"- regulating or pro-
hibiting child labor,294 limiting the right to vote, 295 restricting gun pur-
chases and usage,296 prohibiting cigarette usage297 and alcohol consump-
lish home and rear children).
29 See Allen v. City of Bordentown, 524 A.2d 478, 487 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1987).
290 See, e.g., McCollester v. City of Keene, 586 F. Supp. 1381, 1386 (D.N.H. 1984).
29' Many laws also subject the parent to liability for inadequate supervision. The
original Dallas ordinance imposed a penalty on a parent who "knowingly permits, or by
insufficient control allows, the minor to remain in any public place or on the premises
of any establishment within the city during curfew hours." Original Dallas Ordinance,
supra note 18, § 31-33(b)(2). The ordinance imposed on the recalcitrant parent a fine
not to exceed $500. Id. § 31-33(e)(2). Wichita, Kansas, recently enacted a curfew ordi-
nance that imposes fines on parents, generating an explosive reaction among parents
objecting to liability for the actions of children they could not control. WICHITA, KAN.,
MUN. CODE §§ 5.52010-.52030 (1995). Because of the temptation to enforce the ordi-
nance selectively, see infra part V.E.2 and accompanying text, the typical minor violator
likely will emanate from an impoverished family without capacity to pay the fine.
292 Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242, 1262 (M.D. Pa. 1975),
affid, 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 964 (1976).
23 But see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (holding that parents may remove
children from public school after the eighth grade when continued attendance would
gravely endanger the free exercise of their religious beliefs).
29 See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (holding that a mother
could be prosecuted under child labor laws for using her children to dispense literature
in streets).
29 See U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI ("The right of citizens of the United States, who
are eighteen years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United
States or by any State on account of age"); see also Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112
(1970) (holding unconstitutional provisions of the Voting Rights Act Amendments of
1970 that sought to authorize 18-year-olds to vote in state elections).
296 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(1) (1994) (restricting sale of firearm to anyone un-
der age 21); id. § 923 (requiring firearms distributor to procure license from potential
buyer by showing age of at least 21).
297 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-12-3 (1994) (prohibiting sale of cigarettes to minors);
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tion, 98 limiting operation of a motor vehicle,2 9 and preventing abuse and
neglect."l
The curfew, however, neither assists in the discharge of parental super-
visory duties nor qualifies as a justified usurpation of the parental role in
circumstances in which parental control cannot otherwise be provided.3"'
The criminal penalties cannot possibly encourage parents to exercise greater
supervision and control when extant laws with greater penalties do not.30 2
Additionally, the purview of the ordinance may cover situations in which
parents did in fact valiantly attempt to exercise reasonable control and guid-
ance.
30 3
Further, the argument that curfew laws make parents the primary agents
of enforcement is spurious; 3°4 public law enforcement authorities enforce
curfew laws. Neither the law nor the legal system can coerce good parenting
skills.
Thus, by dictating private parental decisions, curfew enactments con-
script the liberties of parents to familial privacy and to freedom from gov-
ernmental intrusion in childrearing decisions. By wholly repudiating the
parental role, the curfew imposes a significant burden. Its means are
neither narrowly tailored to the end nor the least restrictive manner of ac-
complishing the objective. It does not reaffirm, but supplants, the parental
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1241 (West 1994) (same); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
ANN. § 161.081 (West 1995) (same).
298 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-46-112 (West 1991) (prohibiting sale of
alcoholic beverages to persons under age 21); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 138, § 34A
(West 1991) (same).
299 See, e.g., ALA. CODE ANN. § 32-5-64 (1989) (prohibiting persons under the age of
16 from operating a motor vehicle); D.C. CODE ANN. § 40-301 (1991) (same); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 302.250 (Vernon 1994) (same).
100 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3619 (1989) (criminalizing child abuse and
neglect); CAL. PENAL CODE § 273(a) (West 1994) (same).
301 See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 632-40 (1979); McCollester v. City of Keene,
586 F. Supp. 1381, 1386 (D.N.H. 1984).
302 Cf Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242, 1255 (M.D. Pa.
1975) (holding that curfew encourages parental supervision), affid, 535 F.2d 1245 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 964 (1976).
'30 See McCollester v. City of Keene, 514 F. Supp. 1046, 1053 (D.N.H. 1981), rev'd
on other grounds, 668 F.2d 617 (1st Cir. 1982).
304 City of Panora v. Simmons, 445 N.W.2d 363, 370 (Iowa 1989).
305 In Qutb, the Fifth Circuit held that the defenses ameliorated any constitutional
burden on parental rights: "[T]he only aspect of parenting that this ordinance bears upon
is the parents' right to allow the minor to remain in public places, unaccompanied by a
parent or guardian or other authorized person, during the hours restricted by the curfew
ordinance." Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488, 495-96 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.
Ct. 2134 (1994). The district court had ridiculed this position, speculating that parents
could simply accompany their children on dates. Qutb, No. CA 3-91-CV-1310-R, slip
op. at 28.
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role. Certainly, familial intervention and teaching parenting skills would be
both less restrictive and more productive means of achieving the states'
goals. They also, of course, would be significantly more expensive.
The curfew's purported function of instilling family values and supervi-
sion is its greatest social irony. First, juveniles most likely to be violators
are those most bereft of the instilled familial patterns of responsibility and
control that might cause them to remain at home during nocturnal hours.
Thus, the hope of voluntary compliance by those who actually endanger the
community is ephemeral or, at best, minimal. Secondly, the home can be a
very dangerous place. The curfew thus precludes the child from acting on a
responsible decision to leave an abusive home and places the child in the
home at a time when abuse is most likely to occur.3°6
E. Equal Protection
1. The Minor/Adult Classification
Although a categorization based on age is not a suspect classifica-
tion,"' age discrimination is subject to strict scrutiny if it implicates a fun-
damental freedom.3"8 Because a curfew enactment likely could withstand
the more lenient, deferential rational basis review, a finding of infringement
of a fundamental liberty is critical to a conclusion of unconstitutionality.
309
306 In Qutb, the plaintiffs introduced a sociological study concluding that evening
hours in the home were the most dangerous for youth. Further, the statistics indicated
that runaways comprised a substantial portion of the nighttime arrestees. Many of these
likely violated the legitimate rules of good parents; however, many likely acted to save
their physical or emotional lives.
307 See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 470 (1991).
308 See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985);
United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 268 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S.
184, 192 (1964). But see San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40
(1973) (holding that classification that neither affects a fundamental right nor creates a
suspect class needs only bear some rational relationship to a legitimate governmental
purpose).
311 In Bykofsky, for example, the court found that the enactment, although discrimina-
tory on the basis of age, did not infringe a fundamental right and thus applied the ratio-
nal basis test. Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242, 1265 (M.D. Pa.
1975), affid, 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 964 (1976). The court easi-
ly concluded that because minors as a class are intrinsically distinct from adults, the
classification was neither arbitrary nor irrational. Id. The court further rejected a chal-
lenge to the maximum age selected, reasoning that the legislature could draw lines in a
rational manner and, although at some point the government could no longer regulate in
this manner, the classification was not unreasonable. Id. at 1265-66. But see Waters v.
Barry, 711 F. Supp. 1121, 1139 (D.D.C. 1989) (concluding that the curfew act could
not satisfy even rational basis review).
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As discussed, the curfew intrinsically infringes freedom of movement,
and has a significant effect on express constitutional liberties such as free-
dom of speech and association. Consequently, because the curfew only af-
fects minors, it can survive strict scrutiny analysis only if it is narrowly tai-
lored to serve a compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive
means of accomplishing that objective.31
In Dallas, crime statistics indicated that persons between the ages of
seventeen and twenty-six years old committed the greatest proportion of
crime, particularly violent offenses." Thus, a juvenile curfew cannot be-
gin to accomplish the objective of curtailing the primary incidence of crime.
Further, because a curfew enactment deters only the innocent, 3 2 the
relevant classification is between law-abiding adults and law-abiding youth.
This classification cannot possibly withstand even minimal constitutional
scrutiny. The curfew enactment is not only not narrowly tailored, it is irra-
tional, and violates the Equal Protection Clause under any standard of analy-
sis.
2. Selective Enforcement
The juvenile curfew bristles with the potential for selective enforcement,
a situation proscribed by the Equal Protection Clause.313 Selective enforce-
ment is virtually inevitable for at least three reasons. First, the provisions
are inherently vague and ambiguous and thus incapable of balanced enforce-
ment. If an enactment requires persons of common intelligence to guess its
meaning at the peril of liberty, it is unconstitutionally void for vague-
ness.314 Vague language and inadequate standards vest in law enforcement
officers unconfined discretion, unconstitutionally authorizing discriminatory
and selective enforcement.
The Dallas ordinance includes defenses for an "other recreational activi-
ty" sponsored by an "other similar entity," 315-purported standards that are
unworkable from the standpoint of the minor, the enforcing officer, and the
factfinder.316 A New Jersey court held unconstitutionally vague the terms
310 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479
(1960).
311 Plaintiff's evidence. Personal knowledge of the author.
312 See supra part V.B.1.
313 See S.W. v. State, 431 So.2d 339, 341 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (declaring juve-
nile curfew ordinance unconstitutional on the basis that it interfered with myriad legiti-
mate activities and was not rationally related to its purpose).
314 See Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572-73 (1974); Papachristou v. City of Jack-
sonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972).
315 Amended Dallas Ordinance, supra note 18, § 31-33(c)(1)(G).
316 See Qutb v. City of Dallas, No. CA 3-91-CV-1310-R, slip op. at 33 (N.D. Tex.
Aug 10, 1992), rev'd sub nom. Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. de-
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"reasonable judgment," "annoyance," "free passage," and "emergency er-
rand." 7 Other courts object to "loiter, idle, wander or play," '318 "bona fi-
de, 319 "parentally approved supervised activity, 320 "reasonable necessi-
ty," "normal, minor well along the road to maturity," "consistent with the
public interest," and "best interest of said minors. 32' Drafting a law with
more precise terms is difficult, if not impossible.
Secondly, as a practical matter, governmental instrumentalities do not
possess sufficient resources to enforce curfew laws fully. Enforcement au-
thorities simply cannot stop every person who appears to be within the cur-
few, nor can every violator be placed within the judicial system. The poten-
tial is thus great that enforcement authorities will allocate resources to select
only certain persons or classes of persons for seizure and prosecution or
confine enforcement to certain geographical areas.
Finally, allocation of resources is, as a practical matter, responsible law
enforcement. The enactments are not intended to confine the innocent to the
home; they are intended as a tool of law enforcement. They are intended, in
effect, as instruments for selective enforcement in known crime areas, as
authority to circumvent the constraints of the Fourth Amendment. Thus,
facially, the inordinate potential, if not necessity, for discriminatory law
enforcement may also make the curfew law unconstitutional under the Equal
Protection Clause.
CONCLUSION
The objectives of the curfew enactment are compelling. Certainly, juve-
niles require protection from criminal victimization and command induce-
ment not to engage in criminal activity. Certainly, juveniles should not be
wandering the streets in the late evening or early morning hours. Neverthe-
less, a governmentally imposed curfew is not the solution. It unconstitution-
ally restricts the movement of the innocent and deprives all youths, most of
whom are law-abiding, of precious constitutional liberties. Its intent and
effect is to eviscerate the mandates of the Fourth Amendment, and it
criminalizes innocence.
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Aside from its constitutional problems, the curfew stultifies maturation.
Further, it cannot begin, to touch the societal and familial deterioration that
are underlying causes of crime. It cannot begin to reach the troubled youth.
Only measures directed at these ills truly can alleviate juvenile crime and
victimization.
Finally, the constitutional infirmities are extreme and incurable. The
more efficacious the curfew law-the more it restricts freedom of move-
ment-the greater its constitutional defects. A society that permits the noc-
turnal imprisonment of its youth simply cannot call itself free.
As all agree, the curfew is not a panacea. Under the Constitution, it is
not even an option.
